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On July 14, 1798, more than six years after the ratification of the First
Amendment, the Federalist controlled Congress of the United States passed the Sedition

Act.1 This Act, codifying the substantive English common law of seditious libel, made it
a federal crime to publish defamatory matter against the Congress, President, or
government of the United Stales. Republican critics of the act argued it to be

unconstitutional as a violation of Congress’ limited powers, and the First Amendment’s
press clause.

2

Federalists, however, interpreted this clause to permit prosecutions for

seditious libel. The ensuing public controversy over the Sedition Act represented the first
serious debate over the original meaning of the First Amendment’s press clause and was

thus an important early juncture in American constitutional development.4 Because no
defendant convicted under the Act appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court never had

the opportunity to review the Act’s constitutionality before its expiration in 1801.
In supporting the Sedition Act, Federalists attempted to reconcile the common law

with the First Amendment’s press clause. A closer examination of their arguments shows

1 An Act in Addition to the act, entitled “An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the
United States,” 1 Stat. 596.
2 The common law is both a system of jurisprudence and a body of customary law's, established by
community tradition and judicial precedent. It remains the basis of law in England and most of its former
possessions, including the United States. A comparison of the Sedition Act and common-law seditious
libel follows in Part III.
3 The First Amendment to the Constitution states, in its entirety: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances.”
4 Original intent or meaning refers to the principal understanding of constitutional provisions as
held by the framers al the time of drafting, rather than later interpretations by others.
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how Federalists brought about a theoretical shift in the seditious libel doctrine, adapting it

to the jurisprudence of the written Constitution. Early state and federal court cases, as

well as influential legal commentaries, further demonstrate that Federalist arguments
were generally well received in the law. This thesis proposes that Federalists were able
to impart a common-law understanding to the freedom of the press, thus establishing the

doctrine of seditious libel in First Amendment jurisprudence.
I.

Background to the Sedition Act Controversy

A. The Sedition Act in Historical Context
The political origin of the Sedition Act lies in the late eighteenth-century wars

between Great Britain and France, which erupted after the French Revolution in 1789.
The conflict spread throughout the whole of Europe, and threatened to embroil the United
States. Hoping to avoid foreign entanglements, George Washington proclaimed in 1793

American neutrality in the struggle between Britain and France. Despite such neutrality,
Great Britain began to interdict the Atlantic shipping of the United States in an attempt to

disrupt French foreign commerce. British interference with American shipping escalated
sharply so as to threaten war between the two nations.5

To resolve the worsening situation, President Washington dispatched John Jay as
special envoy to Great Britain. Jay succeeded in securing a treaty permitting some

British inspection of American ships bound for France, closing American harbors to
French privateers, and settling some disputes outstanding since the end of the

Revolutionary War. The Senate ratified the Jay Treaty in 1795, averting the crisis with

Great Britain. France, offended by the Jay Treaty and finding it repugnant to the 1778

5 James Morton Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil
Liberties (Ilhaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), 5.
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alliance with the United States, responded by raiding American shipping. When, in 1796,
Washington appointed Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to replace James Monroe as

ambassador to France, France effectively severed diplomatic relations with the United
States by refusing Pinckney’s credentials. By the time Pinckney’s reports reached the

United Slates, John Adams had succeeded Washington to the Presidency.6

Responding to the crisis, Adams appointed John Marshall and Elbridge Gerry to
join Pinckney in Paris, with the purpose of negotiating a settlement with France. The

diplomatic mission became a fiasco, however, when French representatives first
demanded substantial monetary contributions before opening negotiations. Upon

receiving the American diplomatic dispatches revealing the French demands, Adams
presented them to Congress and called for defensive measures. Congress approved
the strengthening of fortifications, the raising and outfitting of an army, naval
improvements, and a trade embargo against France. Additionally, Congress authorized

the President to order the navy to engage French vessels suspected of raiding American

shipping.7
France’s attempt to extort the American delegation created a surge of anli-French
public opinion, and war with France appeared increasingly likely to Federalists.

Republicans, on the other hand, denounced American policy with France as unwise and

serving British interests. Vociferous journalistic attacks by Republicans against
government policy especially chafed Federalists, who perceived expressions of sympathy

with France to be inimical to the United Slates and its national security. It was within

6 John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1952), 4; Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 5.

7 Miller, Crisis in Freedom, 4-5; Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 6-8.
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this context and with the intent of implementing internal security measures, that the

Federalists passed the Alien and Sedition laws. These laws provided for stricter control
of immigration and the punishment of individuals who published criticisms of the

government.

Q

The Sedition Act, in particular, provoked opposition among Republicans, who
condemned it as unconstitutional.9 Despite much opposition to the Act, the United States

prosecuted several individuals under the law, including a Vermont Congressman and
prominent Republican printers. The growing opposition to the Sedition Act among the

public partially contributed to Thomas Jefferson’s defeat of Adams and the Republicans
gaining control of Congress in the 1800 elections. The new Congress failed to renew the
Act, which expired by its own provisions on March 3, 1801.10 President Jefferson, who

insisted the Act was unconstitutional, granted a general pardon to all those convicted
under it.11 While the controversy over the Sedition Act had passed, the issue of its

constitutionality remained unsettled.

8 Miller, Crisis in Freedom. 5-10; Smith, Freedom's Fetters. 21,35, 50-52, 94-95; Congress
passed three acts respecting aliens. The Naturalization Act, 1 Slat. 566 (1798), lengthened to fourteen
years the residency period required for naturalization. The Alien Act, 1 Slat. 570 (1798), and the Alien
Enemies Act, 1 Slat. 577 (1798), gave the President authority to order the arrest and deportation of resident
aliens suspected of threatening the security of the United States.
9 John Marshall was the only prominent Federalist who opposed the Sedition Act. He did so,
however, on political and not constitutional grounds. Smith, Freedom's Fetters. 151; Miller, Crisis in
Freedom. 182-183; Gregg Costa, “John Marshall, the Sedition Act, and Free Speech in the Early
Republic,” Texas Law Review 'll (1999): 1026.

10 Section four of the Sedition Act stated: “And be it further enacted. That this act shall continue
and be in force until the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and one, and no longer: Provided.
that the expiration of the act shall not prevent or defeat a prosecution and punishment of any offence
against the law, during the lime it shall be in force.”; Smith, Freedom's Fetters. 185-187; Miller, Crisis in
Freedom. 230.
11 Smith, Freedom's Fetters. 268.
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B. Early Interpretations of the Sedition Act Controversy

Despite using various thematic approaches to examine the constitutionality of
seditious libel in the early republic, scholars have generally focused upon the original

intent of the Constitution and the First Amendment. Scholars generally agree that the
passage of the Sedition Act in 1798 marked a significant period in American

constitutional history, as it occasioned the first serious public debate about whether the

First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press permitted prosecutions for

seditious libel. Zechariah Chafee, Jr. proposed that sophisticated constitutional
arguments on the meaning of the First Amendment’s press clause did not appear until the
debate over the Sedition Act, years after the Amendment’s ratification.12 James Morton

Smith noted that “the Alien and Sedition Laws played a prominent role in shaping the

American tradition of civil liberties,” while Leonard W. Levy concurred that 1798
marked the date of origin for a truly libertarian free press theory in America.13 Other

scholars, though not explicitly declaring 1798 to be a crucial year in constitutional
history, nonetheless recognized that premise by focusing their study upon the Sedition
Act controversy.14
Chafee and Leonard W. Levy have articulated the two competing theses on the

12 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1941), 16, 29.
13 Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 431; Ibid., 426; Leonard W. Levy, “Liberty and the First
Amendment: 1790-1800,” The American Historical Review 68, no. 1 (1962): 22; Leonard W. Levy,
Emergence of a Free Press (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), xi-xii.
14 William T. Mayton, “Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression,”
Columbia Law Review 84 (January 1984): 121-122; Philip Hamburger, “The Development of the Law of
Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press,” Stanford Law Review 37 (February 1985): 745; Walter Berns,
“Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal,” in The Supreme Court Review,
1970, cd. Philip B. Kurland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 123-124, 129, 135; Adrienne
Koch and Harry Ammon, “The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson’s and
Madison’s Defense of Civil Liberties,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d scr., 5, no. 2 (1948): 174-176.
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issue of whether the First Amendment permitted seditious libel. Emphasizing the

founders’ libertarian ideals and their familiarity with radical English Whig political
thought, Chafee argues that the Revolution did away with the law of seditious libel.15

Levy acknowledges the connection between English and American liberal ideas, but

observes that Anglo-American political commentators continued to acquiesce to the

fundamental principles of seditious libel. He therefore disagrees with Chafee, finding
that the Revolution and First Amendment did not abolish the concept of seditious libel,

and that a truly libertarian theory of the press did not emerge until after the Sedition Act
controversy in 1798.16

Other scholars generally espouse either the Chafee or Levy thesis, while taking

different approaches to examining the constitutionality of seditious libel. William T.
Mayton argues that the limited congressional powers and federalism inherent in the

structure of the Constitution prohibited seditious libel. Walter Berns, as well as Adrienne
Koch and Harry Ammon, examine the role of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions in
promoting the cause of states’ rights, and opposing the constitutionality of a federal law

of seditious libel.17 Kathryn Preyer and Robert C. Palmer find little or no legal support
for the existence of a federal common law, which would have supported the

constitutionality of seditious libel. 18
15 Chafee, Free Speech, 16, 18, 21; Chafee elaborated upon Henry Schofield’s prior assertion that
the Revolution had the object of getting rid of common-law seditious libel, which was later incompatible
with the First Amendment. Sec Henry Schofield, Essays on Constitutional Law and Equity (New York: Da
Capo Press, 1972), 2:521-522, 535.

16 Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, xii, 100-102, 121, 169-170.
17 May ton, “Lost Guarantee,” 94-97, 105-108, 114-115, 117-119; Berns, “Freedom of the Press,”
in Supreme Court Review, 110-111, 123-124, 129, 135; Koch and Ammon, “Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions,” 157, 174-176.
18 Kathryn Preyer, “Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common Law

1
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Responding to Preycr and Palmer, Stephen B. Presser looks beyond the
constitutionality of federal common law to examine the endurance of Federalists’

conservative jurisprudence. J. R. Pole further emphasizes that common law was so
ingrained in American jurisprudence that there was little or no desire on the part of the

founders to substantially alter its form. James P. Martin follows this line of analysis by
placing the Sedition Act in the context of a broader Federalist theory of representation.

Martin argues that by supporting a strictly republican, as opposed to a popularly
democratic government, Federalists saw the concept of seditious libel as necessary to
channel political action through elected officials.19 The work of Presser, Pole, and Martin

suggests that “there were, in the 1790s, operating in America, at least two basic political
philosophies or ideologies . . . influencing attitudes toward constitutional and legal

interpretation. . . . ,,20 These ideologies were those of Federalists and Republicans. The
Sedition Act thus expressed elements of Federalist political theory, and represented an

alternative interpretation of the First Amendment’s press clause.
A number of scholars, whatever aspect of the Sedition Act controversy they
explore, ultimately turn to the original meaning of the Constitution and the First

Amendment.21 Yet, as Jack N. Rakove asserts, the disparate political interests and

of Crimes in the Early Republic,” Law and History Review 4, no. 2 (1986): 224-233, 262-264; Robert C.
Palmer, 'The Federal Common Law of Crime,” Law and History Review 4, no. 2 (1986): 271-273, 279281.

19 Slcphcn B. Presser, “The Supra-Conslitulion, the Courts, and the Federal Common Law' of
Crimes: Some Commcnls on Pole and Preycr,” Law and History Review 4, no. 2 (1986): 325-327, 330-331,
334-335; J. R. Pole, “Reflections on American Law and the American Revolution,” William and Mary
Quarterly, 3d scr., 50, no. 1 (1993): 139-140, 153; James P. Martin, “When Repression is Democratic and
Constitutional: The Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798,” The University of
Chicago Law Review 66 (1999): 117-182.
20 Presser, “Supra-Conslitulion,” 330.

21 Pole, Presser, and Marlin have avoided an examination of original intent in favor of evaluating

8

understanding of the Constitution among the framers, as well as the wide concerns over

meaning expressed by delegates to the state ratifying conventions, make the
determination of original intent difficult. Rakove argues that any search for original

meaning must consider these multiple interests. The original meaning of the
Constitution, if there ever really was one, is therefore as elusive to the modem scholar as
it was to contemporaries. 22 The intense political controversy surrounding the Sedition

Act illustrates the problem of discerning original intent. As Smith suggests, the Sedition

Act was intended by the Federalists as a legal weapon to destroy Republican political
opposition. Levy cautiously recognizes that any evidence from the Sedition Act

controversy that reflected on the issue of original meaning was politically charged, and
not conclusive of the intent of the framers.23 The contrast between Republican and

Federalist political ideologies also exemplifies the significant differences in theoretical
approaches to constitutional jurisprudence, and raises the possibility of similar theoretical
disagreements among individual framers.24 As Levy and Rakove suggest, the variety of

the conservative nature of Federalist jurisprudence, and its role in shaping early constitutional
interpretation.
22 Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (New
York: Vintage Books, 1996), 10, 14-15, 339-341.
23 Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 21, 186; James Morton Smith, “The Sedition Law, Free Speech, and
the American Political Process,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d scr., 9, no. 4 (1952): 505; James Morion
Smith, “President John Adams, Thomas Cooper, and Sedition: A Case Study in Suppression,” The
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 42, no. 3 (1955): 438, 465; Although Levy refuses to state for certain
the framers’ intent, he nevertheless confidently finds that all the historical evidence supports his argument
that the framers accepted the law of seditious libel. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 268-269, 279-282,
348-349; In Crisis in Freedom, Miller’s examination of the Sedition Act in the context of party rivalries
further demonstrates the political partisanship behind Federalist and Republican arguments as to the
meaning of the First Amendment’s press clause.
24 While Republicans advocated liberal democracy based upon popular participation, Federalists
sought to restrict public political commentary in favor of a strictly representative government. Miller,
Crisis in Freedom, 15-20; Smith, “Case Study in Suppression,” 464-465; Smith, “Sedition Law,” 499-500;
Marlin, “Federalist Theory of Representation,” 119, 127; Marshall Smclscr portrayed the early national
period as an age of passion, when politics were expressions of suspicion and odium between Federalists

9

possible motivations among the framers’ makes it difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain
original intent.

As Federalist and Republican arguments for or against the Sedition Act show, the

Constitution was subject to varying interpretive approaches during the early republic.
The above-mentioned scholars have rightly recognized that the Sedition Act debate

implicated issues of strict and broad constitutional constructionism, federalism, and party

politics. By searching for the framers’ original intent as to the constitutionality of
seditious libel, however, most scholars have partially overlooked the historical
significance of the Sedition Act. The Sedition Act controversy is most important not as a

debate over original intent, but as a formative period in First Amendment theory. The

vitality of the Sedition Act controversy shows that Americans disputed the original

meaning of freedom of the press, and that the First Amendment was subject to competing
interpretations during the early republic. Despite Republican arguments to the contrary,
Federalists interpreted the Constitution to allow federal seditious libel prosecutions. In

doing so. Federalists articulated a new theoretical justification for seditious libel,
adapting it from its common-law origins to American politics. In this way, the
substantive doctrine of seditious libel entered First Amendment jurisprudence.

II.

Federalists and a Constitutional Theory of Seditious Libel

Although the thirteen slates had always adhered to the common law of England,

each had maintained separate and independent legal jurisdictions. Consequently, the law

varied among the states, which shared no unified and supreme body of law under either
the British Empire or the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution, however, created a

and Republicans. Marshall Smclscr, “The Federalist Period as an Age of Passion,” American Quarterly 10,
no. 4 (1958): 391,419.

I
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national legal structure apart from state law and common to all members of the union.
The years of the early republic would be impressionable ones for American constitutional

law, and the legal principles first established would influence subsequent constitutional
interpretation by both jurists and politicians. The arguments either supporting or

condemning the constitutionality of the Sedition Act would, therefore, be formative to
First Amendment press law.

According to Smith, “the debates on the Sedition Law turned on two points, the
jurisdiction over libels and the nature of free speech.”25 Federalists and Republicans
addressed both issues. Federalists based federal jurisdiction over libels on either the

common law itself, or the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution. Along with
these jurisdictional arguments, Federalists defined freedom of the press by the common

law, thereby permitting seditious libel prosecutions. Republicans rejected both views as
being contrary to the Constitution’s limited grant of powers to the national government.
In arguing for the constitutionality of the Sedition Act, Federalists propounded a subtle,
yet significant, shift in the legal theory of seditious libel. This shift adapted the common

law doctrine of seditious libel to the jurisprudence of a written constitution. By
reconciling seditious libel with the Constitution, Federalists profoundly shaped the

development of subsequent First Amendment press theory.
A. Common-Law Seditious Libel and the Sedition Act Compared

/. The Common Law
The freedom, or liberty, of the press had been a fundamental principle of English

25 Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 148.
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common law long before the ratification of the First Amendment. Until the last decade of
the seventeenth century, both Parliament and English kings relied upon licensing to

control the press. By that time, however, the government’s prior censorship of the press

became too difficult to enforce and aroused considerable opposition. Abandoning
licensing, the government turned to seditious libel prosecutions as the preferred method

of press regulation.26 The doctrine of seditious libel first emerged in 1606, when crown
prosecutor Edward Coke argued before the Star Chamber that written defamation of

public officials was a prosecutable offense distinguishable from private libel.27 Such
libels, according to Coke, were more severe because they threatened the stability of the

state.28 When in the 1690s the government began to rely more heavily upon seditious
libel prosecutions to control the press, the doctrine became increasingly associated with

defamation of the government itself, rather than just individual officials 29 By the middle
of the eighteenth century, the English common law had adopted both seditious libel and

the prohibition of licensing as the cornerstones of a free press theory.

26 The Crown briefly attempted to replace licensing with treason prosecutions for critical
publications, but was soon restricted by parliamentary act. Hamburger, “Development of the Law,” 714717, 719, 722-725; Alan J. Koshncr, “The Founding Fathers and Political Speech: The First Amendment,
the Press and the Sedition Act of 1798,” Si. Louis University Public Law Review 6 (1987): 401.

27 De Libellis Fatnosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber 1606); The Star Chamber was a legal
tribunal separate from the established common-law courts. It was a manifestation of royal prerogative,
unrestrained by the substantive and procedural requirements of the common law. Parliament abolished the
Star Chamber in 164 1, as part of its attack on royal authority. Seditious libel prosecutions were
subsequently brought in common-law courts. J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3d cd.
(London: Butterworths, 1990), 136-137.
28

Hamburger, “Development of the Law,” 691-695; Koshncr, “Founding Fathers,” 402.

29

Hamburger. “Development of the Law,” 701, 725, 740-741.

30 Because the concept of seditious libel first developed in the Star Chamber and circumvented
regular common-law procedures, Mayion suggests that it is was not properly a part of the common-law.
Hamburger disputes this notion, stating that the law of seditious libel was mostly the product of
modifications made in the common-law courts of the early eighteenth century. While the historical
arguments of both Mayton and Hamburger may have merit, the fact remains that seditious libel was

1
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The common law narrowly defined the liberty of the press as freedom from prior
governmental restraint on publication. The government’s prosecution of seditious libels

after their publication, however, did not infringe or violate such liberty. As the eminent
English jurist William Blackstone explained in his Commentaries on the Laws of
England'.
In this, and the other instances which we have lately considered, where
blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels
are punished by the English law, some with a greater, others with a less degree of
severity; the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or
violated. The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state:
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this,
is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity.

The common law did not guarantee the unfettered right for the individual to print

anything he chose. Despite its prohibition of prior restraints, the common law offered
only narrow protection to press activities. The threat of prosecution still had a chilling
effect on political commentary, and allowed the government to exercise indirect control

over the press. Given the broad concept of what constituted a libel, the true measure of
■

•

39

press protection was the tolerance of the government and the courts for criticism. "
The legal definition of libels encompassed a wide range of criticisms against the

established political, religious, and social order. Blackstone defined libels as “malicious
defamations of any person, and especially a magistrate, made public by either printing,

nevertheless widely accepted as a common-law doctrine. Mayion, “Lost Guarantee,” 102-103, 105-107;
Hamburger, “Development of the Law,” 752, 757.
31 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First Edition of
1765-1769 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 4:151-152.
32 Once the law accepts the premise that there may be permissible restrictions on the press,
deciding on which published matter to prohibit seems to become the critical issue.
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writing, signs, or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public

hatred, contempt, and ridicule” [footnote omitted].33 William Hawkins, another legal
commentator read widely by eighteenth-century practitioners in the common law,

concurred in this definition of libels.34 Actions for libels could be either private or

public, with the former being a claim by an individual for harm done to him, and the

latter being a punishable crime for bringing the government or its officials into
disrepute. 3 5 The law proscribed both sorts of libel due to their tendency to incite public
violence and disorder. Libels against the government were especially dangerous, as they

were seditious and undermined lawful government. Hawkins commented:

It is a very high aggravation of a libel that it tends to scandalize the government,
by reflecting on those who are entrusted with the administration of public affairs,
which doth not only endanger the public peace, as all other libels do, by stirring
up the parties immediately concerned in it to acts of revenge, but also has a direct
tendency to breed in the people a dislike of their governors, and incline them to
faction and sedition.
Public discourse on political affairs or the government was permissible, so long as it did
not criticize the government or its officials in such a manner as to question or threaten

government authority. 37
There were two significant procedural aspects to the common law of seditious

libel. “In such prosecutions,” explained Blackstone, “the only facts to be considered are,

33 Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:150.

34 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, cd. Thomas Leach (London: G. G. and
J. Robinson, 1795), 2:127.
35

Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:150.

36

Hawkins, Pleas, 2:129.

37 Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:152; Buller clarified that criticism of a government official’s
ability was not necessarily actionable, while impugn of his integrity was. Francis Buller, An Introduction to
the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius (Dublin: Eliz. Lynch, 1791), 4.
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first, the making or publishing of the book or writing; and secondly, whether the matter

be criminal: and, if both these points arc against the defendant, the offence against the

public is complete.”

TQ

Although a libel against a private person generally had to be false

in order to sustain an action, libels charged as criminally seditious were punishable even
though true. According to Blackstone:

It is immaterial with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the matter of it be
true or false [footnote omitted]; since the provocation, and not the falsity, is the
thing to be punished criminally: though, doubtless, the falshood [szc] of it may
aggravate it’s [szc] guilt, and enhance its punishment. ... In a criminal
prosecution, the tendency which all libels have to create animosities, and to
disturb the public peace, is the sole consideration of the law.
Seditious libels, even if true, still tended to undermine legitimate government authority.
To protect the government, the common law discouraged them, truthful or not, through

the threat of criminal punishment.

It was a question of fact, to be decided by a jury, whether an individual charged

with a libel had actually made the publication at issue. The judge, however, determined
whether the matter published was libelous as a matter of law. The question of the

publication’s criminality was beyond the competence of the jury, the role of which was
limited to making a determination of fact. Only the judge could decide the ultimate issue

of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.40 The judge also held broad discretion under the

common law for sentencing those whom he found guilty of making a seditious libel. The

penalty could be cither fine or imprisonment.41 The common law, while affording some

38

Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:150-151.

39

Ibid., 4:150.

40

Hamburger, “Development of the Law,” 713, 753.

41

Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:151.
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degree of freedom of expression, provided little procedural protection for the individual
on trial for seditious libel.

Although narrow by modem standards, the common-law concept of the freedom

of the press supposedly protected the expression of individual opinion:
Thus the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that free will is the
object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of
thought or enquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or
making public, of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime
which society corrects.42
The common law thus trusted the individual, not the state, with choosing subject matter

for publication. The law, however, obligated the individual to publish responsibly. True
liberty lay in acting within the bounds of the law, and thus the freedom of the press did
not extend to the publication of libels. Libels were an abuse of the press, and outside of
legal protection.

By punishing libels, the common law sought a healthy medium between prior

restraint by a tyrannical government and the licentiousness of an abusive press.
Eighteenth-century Anglo-American political theory found this medium in liberty, which
existed through law. John Phillip Reid argues that liberty and licentiousness were

normative legal concepts, evoking substantive obligations towards the rights and
limitations of individual action under the law.43 Bernard Bailyn explains this notion of

liberty:
The very idea of liberty was bound up with the preservation of this
balance of forces. For political liberty, as opposed to the theoretical liberty that
existed in a state of nature, was traditionally known to be “a natural power of
doing or not doing whatever we have a mind” so long as that doing was
42 Ibid., 4:152.

43 John Phillip Reid, The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988), 116, 119.
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“consistent with the rules of virtue and the established laws of the society to
which we belong”; it was “a power of acting agreeable to the laws which are
made and enacted by the consent of the PEOPLE, and in no ways inconsistent
with the natural rights of a single person, or the good of the society.” Liberty, that
is, was the capacity to exercise “natural rights” within limits set not by the mere
will or desire of men in power but by non-arbitrary law - law enacted by
legislatures containing within them the proper balance of forces.44

Reid qualifies Bailyn’s statement by including the common law as defining the bounds of

liberty.45 Liberty could not exist without such legal restraints, which maintained orderly

society and protected individuals from others.46 This idea of liberty contrasted with a
Lockean state of nature, which was incompatible with civil society. Licentiousness

threatened the security of both the individual and community, states Reid, and could
destroy true liberty.47 Just as tyranny destroyed liberty through oppression,

licentiousness led to anarchy. The law therefore had to restrain both government power

and excessive individual behavior. “To have not enough restraint upon the people,”
explains Reid, “could be as fatal as to have not enough restraint on power.”48 Thus, as

Blackstone stated, “so true will it be found, that to censure the licentiousness, is to

maintain the liberty, of the press.”49 The common-law definition of the freedom of the
press was therefore conducive to, not destructive of, liberty as understood in eighteenth-

44 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, cnl. cd. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), 76-77.
45 Reid, Concept of Liberty, 7.
46 Albert W. Alschulcr explains how Blackstone recognized the need to circumscribe individual
rights when necessary for the good of the community. Alschulcr further states that “the Enlightenment
concept of rights was not merely compatible with communitarianism; it was itself an expression of the
communitarian ideals of duty, reciprocity, and equality.” Albert W. Alschulcr, “Rediscovering Blackstone,”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 145, no. 1 (1996): 51-52.
47

Reid, Concept of Liberty, 30-32, 48, 60-61.

48

Ibid., 66; Ibid., 65, 109.

49

Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:153.
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century Anglo-American political thought.
2. The Sedition Act
In the summer of 1798, both the crisis with France and the intensity of domestic

political opposition convinced Federalists that a sedition law was necessary to control the
licentiousness of the press. From the Federalist perspective, such licentiousness existed
in acerbic political commentaries by Republicans, who openly vilified Federalist policies
and supported reconciliation with France.50 Federalists found Republican publications to
be especially pernicious considering the looming threat of war. The Federalist controlled
Congress responded by passing the Sedition Act. This Act essentially codified seditious

libel, but its provisions were less strict than the common law. The Sedition Act’s lenient

comparison to the common law would support Federalist arguments that it did not
abridge the freedom of the press under the First Amendment.
The Sedition Act included two general classes of offenses against the United
States. The first section of the Act made it a federal crime to conspire or counsel others

to break the law of or interfere with the lawful authority of the United States. This
section targeted overt acts tending towards the violation of the law or the breach of the

peace. Section one thus concerned direct criminal actions rather than speech or press
content of a solely political nature. Section two, however, prohibited certain

publications, providing:
That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or procure to
be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly and willingly assist or
aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious
50 Smith states that the Sedition Act was an attempt to suppress the Republican party and influence
the elections of 1800; Smith, “Case Study in Suppression,” 438; Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 21; While
political opportunism was likely a factor, Federalists may have harbored the sincere belief that Republican
sentiments were nonetheless subversive of the Constitution. Miller, Crisis in Freedom, 1 1, 32-36; Levy,
Emergence of a Free Press, 298-300.

18

writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of
the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with
intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the
said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or
to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of
the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any
unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United
States, or any act of the President of the United Slates, done in pursuance of any
such law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States,
or to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any
hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or
government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the
United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years.51

Section two essentially codified the substantive common law of seditious libel, and

granted jurisdiction to federal courts to hear trials brought under the Act. Sections one

and two were complementary, in that both prohibited activities tending to oppose or
undermine lawful governmental authority. Whereas section one prohibited criminal
conspiracy or advocacy against federal laws, section two sought to punish individuals

publishing matter having an indirect and general tendency to excite opposition to the

government.

The Sedition Act, although codifying the doctrine of seditious libel, differed
procedurally from the common law in three significant ways. Section two fixed the

maximum punishment for a violation of the section to two-thousand dollars and no more
than two years imprisonment, thereby limiting the judicial discretion to punish seditious

libels found in the common law. Section three allowed a defendant to introduce into

evidence the truth of the matter published, and also gave the jury the authority to adjudge
guilt. In comparison, the common law did not allow the admission of the truth of the

51 Sedition Act, section two.
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matter published as a defense to the charge.52 The common law also restricted the jury to
deciding whether the defendant made the publication in question, leaving the issue of

guilt to the presiding judge.

The Sedition Act’s procedural modifications of the common law were not an

innovation. American public opinion had favored the admission of truth as a defense and
the ability of the jury to adjudge guilt since the 1735 seditious libel prosecution of John

Peter Zenger in New York. Zenger was the printer of the New-York Weekly Journal, a
newspaper that was opposed to the colony’s governor. After the continuing publication

of articles and editorials critical of the governor, New York’s attorney-general charged

Zenger with seditious libel.53 Andrew Hamilton, a prominent attorney from

Pennsylvania, defended Zenger at trial. Suggesting that the Star Chamber had perverted
the law of seditious libel, Hamilton argued that the truth of the matter published was a
defense to the charge. He further added that the jury, not the judge, was to decide the

issue of the defendant’s guilt. Notwithstanding the fact that the judge clearly over-ruled
his interpretation of the law, Hamilton persisted in making his arguments directly to the

jury. The jury ignored the law and returned a general verdict of not guilty. While not
changing the law of seditious libel, the Zenger case nevertheless established a new
standard for the freedom of the press in America.54

Levy has gone so far as to characterize the Sedition Act as a “truly libertarian

52

Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:150-151.

53

Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 37- 40.

51 A brief Narrative of the Case and Tryal of John Peter Zenger, Printer of the New-York Weekly
Journal (New York: John Pclcr Zenger, 1736), reprinted in Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of the Press from
Zenger to Jefferson (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1996), 44-61; Levy, Emergence of a Free
Press, 41 -44.
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achievement because it represented the final triumph of the principles of the Zenger case.
„55

Federalists themselves drew attention to the ameliorative effects of the Sedition

Act on the common law.56 Compared to the common law, the Sedition Act increased the

procedural protections for an individual accused of seditious libel, while still preserving

its substantive doctrine. By adopting the widely popular Zenger principles, the Sedition
Act may also have codified a slow, but ongoing, transition in America of the common

law of seditious libel itself. Popular support for the Zenger principles throughout the
eighteenth century may reflect the growing perception among Americans that those

reforms had become a part of the common law, modifying the traditional doctrine of
seditious libel.

B. Federalist Arguments for the Constitutionality of Seditious Libel
1. Federal Common Law

The common law of England established in the courts an inherent jurisdiction
over certain crimes not created by statute. As with other doctrines of the common law,

custom, usage, and precedent defined these crimes.57 While courts in the American states

continued to exercise jurisdiction over common-law crimes, it was unclear during the
early Republic whether the federal judiciary enjoyed the same authority. Many Federalist

supporters of the Sedition Act argued that the Constitution implied the existence of a

federal common law of crimes concomitant with the creation of a national government.
Such a common law arose either naturally incident to lawful government or through an

55

Ibid., xi; Ibid., 297.

56

Miller, Crisis in Freedom, 81-83.

57 Black's Law Dictionary', 6th cd., defines common-law crimes as ones “punishable by the force
of the common law, as distinguished from crimes created by statute.”
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expanded interpretation of the Article III, Section 2 extension of judicial powers to all

cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution. Under this view, federal courts
would have possessed an inherent jurisdiction over seditious libel prosecutions even in
the absence of criminal legislation. Although a few party members such as Samuel

Chase and John Marshall doubted federal common-law jurisdiction, Federalists

nevertheless used the common law to define the freedom of the press under the First
Amendment.58

There is no convincing evidence from the Constitutional Convention proceedings
or congressional debates over the Bill of Rights that the framers of the Constitution and

First Amendment actually intended the national judiciary to have common-law
jurisdiction over the press.59 The debates on the Constitution in the state ratifying

conventions show, however, that some delegates did believe that the Constitution implied

some degree of federal authority over the press. The delegates at the Maryland ratifying
convention, for example, seem to have adhered to this view. Along with its ratification of
the Constitution, the Maryland convention considered several amendments for future

acceptance by Congress. Among proposed amendments was one guaranteeing “that the
freedom of the press be inviolably preserved.” As an explanatory note to the

recommended amendment, the Maryland convention stated that “in prosecutions in the
federal courts for libels, the constitutional preservation of this great and fundamental
58 Both Chase and Marshall respectively expressed their opinion in United States v. Worrall, 2
Dallas 384 (C.C.D. Penn. 1798), and United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32 (1812), that a
federal common law was unconstitutional. The Federalists’ determination to pass a sedition statute
suggests that other party members may also have harbored concerns about the constitutionality of
prosecuting seditious libel solely at common law. Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 125, 133.
59 Although on September 3, 1789 the Senate rejected a proposal to define the free press
amendment by the common law, debate records reveal no explanation for its decision. Neil H. Cogan, cd.,
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right may prove invaluable.”60 This comment suggests that the delegates to the Maryland
convention believed that the Constitution permitted federal prosecutions for seditious

libel and that the “great and fundamental right” of the freedom of the press was that
known at the common law. The convention delegates thus seem to have regarded their
proposed amendment only as a constitutional guarantee of the common-law liberty of the

press, rather than as an absolute prohibition of all press regulations by the federal

government.61
Discussion in the Pennsylvania ratification convention touched somewhat more

extensively on the liberty of the press than in other states.62 Speaking in support of the

Constitution, James Wilson denied that the Constitution gave the federal government any
power over the liberty of the press.63 He carefully qualified his assertion, however, by
recognizing that such liberty did not exclude prosecutions for seditious libel. Wilson

The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997), 85; Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 266-267.
60 Jonathan Elliot, cd., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787. Together with
the Journal of the Federal Convention, Luther Martin’s Letter, Yates’s Minutes, Congressional Opinions,
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of ‘98-’99, and Other Illustrations of the Constitution, 2d cd.
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1836), 2:552.

61 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1999), 115.
62 The issue of the freedom of the press came up briefly at other stale ratification conventions.
Richard Dobbs Spaight, a member of the federal constitutional convention, addressed the North Carolina
convention on the freedom of the press by explaining that “the Constitution docs not take it away. It says
nothing of it, and can do nothing to injure it. But it is secured by the constitution of every state in the
Union in the most ample manner.” Considering that all states retained the doctrine of seditious libel,
Spaight seems to have believed that the government could not abridge the freedom of the press as known at
common law. Elliot, Debates, 4:208-209; Patrick Henry expressed concern in the Virginia convention that
Congress might infringe the freedom of the press, immediately after he had praised the common law as the
measure of Anglo-American liberties. Ibid., 3:446-449. Also in the Virginia convention, George Nicholas
allayed fears of a lack of a bill of rights by arguing that the unwritten common law effectively guaranteed
the liberty of the press in England. “It is equally secure with us,” he stated. Ibid., 3:246-247.
63 Wilson was also an influential member of the federal constitutional convention.
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explained:
The idea of the liberty of the press is not carried so far as this in any country.
What is meant by the liberty of the press is, that there should be no antecedent
restraint upon it; but that every author is responsible when he attacks the security
or welfare of the government. . .

He then clarified that the Constitution afforded procedural protections in libel

prosecutions through venue of trial and jury selection.65 Wilson further challenged
opponents of the Constitution to show what authority the Congress would have to

interfere with the liberty of the press “by licensing it to declare what shall be a libel.”66
This comment seems to suggest that Wilson believed the Constitution merely to give no

power to Congress to place prior restraints on the press or require licenses to publish.

Wilson apparently had no reservations about the constitutionality of federal seditious
libel prosecutions. His statements to the Pennsylvania convention are among the clearest
expressions of a possible intent of the framers to permit federal seditious libel

prosecutions. Regardless of its value as an indication of original intent, Wilson’s
comments at least suggest that some Americans at the time interpreted the unamended

Constitution to preserve the liberty of the press as known at common law. Whatever
paucity of evidence there is about the views of the framers and state convention delegates
regarding a federal common law of seditious libel, Congress’ later passage of the Sedition
Act belies any notion that Wilson’s opinion was unique. To the contrary, the Sedition
Act controversy provides clear evidence that many Americans shared Wilson’s view
about the constitutionality of seditious libel.
61

Elliot, Debates, 2:449.

65

Ibid., 2:450.

66 Ibid., 2:468.
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After its passage by the Senate, the sedition bill went to the House of

Representatives on July 5 for approval. As in the Senate, support for the bill in the House
divided along Republican and Federalist party lines, and debate became heated.
Federalists such as John Allen of Connecticut stressed before the House the need for a
sedition law, citing the licentious and inciting nature of Republican criticisms of the

government. Concerned about the threat of war with France, Allen accused Republican
publications of supporting the French, and promoting unlawful domestic opposition to the

government. Some government control over the abuse of the press was, he believed,
necessary for the security of the United States.67 Allen dismissed the Republican
argument that the First Amendment prohibited a sedition law:

The freedom of the press and opinions was never understood to give the right of
publishing falsehoods and slanders, nor of exciting sedition, insurrection, and
slaughter, with impunity. A man was always answerable for the malicious
publication of falsehood. . . ,68

By this statement, Allen defined freedom of the press by the common law, using it as a
method of constitutional construction. Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts, when
addressing the House, supported Allen’s argument by paraphrasing Blackstone’s

definition of the liberty of the press.69
Robert Harper of South Carolina concurred with Allen and Otis, declaring the

freedom of the press to be “no more than that a man shall be at liberty to print what he

pleases, provided he does not offend against the laws, and not that no law shall be passed

6/ Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 112-113; Annals of Congress: The Debates and Proceedings in the
Congress of the United States, 5th Cong., 2d Scss. (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851), 20932097.

68 Ibid., 2097.
69 Ibid., 2148.
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to regulate this liberty of the press.”70 Harper’s explanation, like Blackstone’s,
established the boundary of protected press activity as that which the law allowed.

Publications transgressing the law were subject to punishment. Harper further illustrated
the Federalist interpretation of the First Amendment by proposing an addition to the

sedition bill, declaring that nothing in it would abridge the freedom of the press.71

Samuel Dana, also of Connecticut, joined his Federalist colleagues in defining freedom of
the press by the common law. Dana’s explanation of the sedition bill before the House is

noteworthy, as he stated that “if what is uttered can be proved true, it will not, according

to this bill, be punished as libellous.”72 At the time of Dana’s comment, however, the
original text of the sedition bill did not contain its final clause allowing the admission of

truth into evidence.73 If the English common law defined the freedom of the press, as
Federalists argued, the bill would not have permitted truth as a defense without a

provision specifically providing for it. Dana’s comment could have been either political
posturing or a sincere belief that the law of seditious libel did admit the truth of the

matter published. Dana was mistaken under both the wording of the bill and the English
common law. His opinion may indicate, however, that he and other Americans sincerely
believed the common law of seditious libel to have adopted the principles of the Zenger

case.
In addition to defining the freedom of the press by the common law, Federalists

70 Ibid., 2102.
71 Ibid., 2116; The House did not include Harper’s amendment in the final version of the sedition
bill. Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 126-128.

72 Annals, 5th Cong., 2d Scss., 2112.

73 The sedition bill would undergo several amendments, including additions regarding the
admission into evidence of the truth of the matter published, and the jury’s role in determining the law.
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also argued that the national government possessed a natural right to exercise jurisdiction

over the crime of seditious libel. Allen believed that sedition threatened the existence of

ordered government. The power to pass sedition legislation was therefore “inherent in
every Government because it is necessary to its preservation.”74 Otis likewise concurred

with Allen’s opinion. The government’s right of self-preservation, he argued, was not
necessarily dependent upon any constitutional grant of power.75 Otis additionally
claimed that Article III, Section 2 implied a federal common law jurisdiction by
extending the judicial power to “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this

Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,

under their Authority. . . .” Any case at law generally arising under the Constitution itself
rather than a congressional statute, reasoned Otis, could only be of the common law.

76

The national government could therefore prosecute seditious libel in federal courts solely

at common law, or Congress could enact a sedition statute. The statements of Allen,
Harper, Otis, and Dana show that they believed there was little or no change between the

definition of the liberty of the press under the common law and the Constitution.
During congressional debates on the sedition bill, Federalists first articulated their

basic arguments supporting the constitutionality of the Sedition Act. Federalists
maintained that the freedom of the press under the First Amendment had the same
meaning as under the common law. Federalists thus used the common law as a method

74 Annals, 5th Cong., 2d Scss., 2101; Allen’s assertion of government's right to survival supported
both the inherent common-law jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, as well as making any congressional
sedition law necessary and proper under Article I, Section 8 for the continued survival of the state.
75 Annals, 5th Cong., 2d Scss., 2145-2146.
76 Ibid., 2146-2147.
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of interpreting the Constitution, giving meaning to the legal terms and concepts therein.77
Following this interpretive approach, the First Amendment press clause merely declared

that Congress could place no prior restraints on the press. Subsequent federal
prosecutions for seditious libel, pursuant either to common-law or statutory jurisdiction,

were therefore constitutional.
2. The Example of State Law
In supporting their arguments for the constitutionality of seditious libel,

Federalists such as Representative Harrison Gray Otis relied on state law regarding the
freedom of the press.78 After independence, twelve states expressly retained the English

common law as the basis of their jurisprudence, while most of the states also had
•

•

-

constitutional or statutory provisions guaranteeing the freedom of the press.

*7Q

These

states tended to reconcile the common-law doctrine of seditious libel with their written
press guarantees. It was therefore logical to Federalists that the First Amendment’s press

clause should be interpreted the same as similar guarantees in the states.

Pennsylvania law, for example, demonstrated how the common law could imparl

its traditional meaning to constitutional language protecting the freedom of the press.
Pennsylvania’s constitution of 1776 simply provided that “the freedom of the press ought

not to be restrained.” In 1790, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution, which included
77 Stephen Presser has discussed the cxislencc of “supra-constitutional” principles in Federalist
jurisprudence, integral to the interpretation of the Constitution. The Federalist approach was based upon
the English judicial practice of using the common law as a method of statutory construction. This theory
intimately melded the traditional, unwritten common law with the new, written Constitution. Stephen B.
Presser, “The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist
Constitutional Jurisprudence,” Northwestern University Law Review 84 (1989): 107, 156.
78 Annals, 5th Cong., 2d Scss., 2105, 2145-2146, 2148-2149.

79 Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 183; Miller, Crisis in Freedom, 80-81; The states having
cither constitutional or statutory guarantees of the liberty of the press after 1776 were Delaware, Georgia,
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a more lengthy press clause. This revised guarantee affirmed the liberty of the press,

while simultaneously admitting truth into evidence and allowing the jury to determine
the law in libel prosecutions.80 The 1790 constitution clearly protected freedom of the

press as understood at common law, modified by the Zenger principles. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases of Respublica v. Oswald in 1788 and Respublica v.

Dennie in 1805 interpreted both the 1776 and 1790 press clauses as consistent with the
common law.

O 1

Massachusetts also retained the common-law understanding of the liberty of the

press. Having a free press clause in its constitution of 1780, the state of Massachusetts

nevertheless prosecuted individuals for seditious libel.82 As a bastion of the Federalist
party, Massachusetts also strongly supported the Sedition Act. When in 1798 the

legislature of Virginia called for the support of other states in condemning the Sedition
Act, the Massachusetts legislature issued an official rejection. In its declaration, the

Massachusetts legislature affirmed its support of the Act, and explained its interpretation

Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and
Virginia. Cogan, Complete Bill of Rights, 93-96.

80 Chapter I, Part XII of the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 declared: “That the people have a
right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the
press ought not to be restrained.” In contrast, Article IX, Section VII of the slate’s 1790 constitution stated:
“That lhe printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the
legislature, or any branch of government: And no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The
free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man; and every citizen may
freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In prosecutions
for the publication of papers, investigating the official conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, or
where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence:
And, in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the
direction of the court, as in other cases.” Ibid., 95.
81

1 Dallas 319; 4 Ycaics 267; Both cases arc discussed more thoroughly below.

82 Part I, Article XVI of Massachusclt’s 1780 constitution stated: “The Liberty of the Press is
essential to the security of freedom in a State, it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this
Commonwealth.” Cogan, Complete Bill of Rights, 94; Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 191, 195-197.
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of the First Amendment’s press clause:

This freedom of the press has been explicitly secured by most, if not all the state
constitutions; and of this provision there has been generally but one construction
among enlightened men; that it is a security for the rational use and not the abuse
of the press; of which the courts of law, the juries and people will judge: this right
is not infringed, but confirmed and established by the late act of Congress.83
The position of the Massachusetts legislature reflects the Federalist argument that

constitutional press guarantees only re-affirmed the liberty of the press as known at

common law. Even Virginia, despite its opposition to the Sedition Act, proscribed
,. .

• •

seditious writings.

84

The difference in opinion between the legislatures of Massachusetts

and Virginia thus centered not on the concept of seditious libel itself, but on the extent of
the authority over the press granted by the Constitution to the national government.

A comparison of judicial interpretations of the freedom of the press in New York

and Pennsylvania exemplifies how Federalists reconciled the Constitution with the
common law, of which they found the First Amendment press clause to be merely

declaratory. Seditious libel prosecutions occurred in both states before or during the
Sedition Act controversy, and a few years after the expiration of the Act. These cases
show that many jurists continued to define the freedom of the press by the common law,
whether or not it was protected by a constitutional provision. The courts of New York,
which did not have a constitutional press guarantee, followed only the English common

law. By 1803, New York law had still not incorporated the Zenger principles. The

Pennsylvania law of seditious libel, in comparison, mirrored the provisions of the

83 Counter-resolution of Massachusetts, February 9, 1799, reprinted in The Virginia Report of
1799-1800, touching the Alien and Sedition Laws; Together with the Virginia Resolutions of December 21,
1798, the Debate and Proceedings thereon in the House of Delegates of Virginia, and Several Other
Documents Illustrative of the Report and Resolutions (Richmond. J. W. Randolph, 1850. Facsimile reprint.
New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), 172.

84 Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 195-197.
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Sedition Act. The freedom of the press in Pennsylvania, however, differed little

substantively from that of New York. In neither state did the law of seditious libel

appreciably change during the period of the Sedition Act controversy.
In 1799, New York charged David Frothingham with a criminal libel upon

Alexander Hamilton. Frothingham was a printer for the Argus, a Republican newspaper

in New York City. As New York had no constitutional free press guarantee, the
prosecution proceeded solely at common law. The indictment in the case, brought by the

state attorney’s office upon the urging of Hamilton himself, charged Frothingham with

accusing Hamilton of abusing his position as Secretary of the Treasury to make corrupt
financial speculations. The indictment additionally alleged that Frothingham insinuated
that Hamilton intended to subvert the Republican party by purchasing the notoriously
anti-Federalist Philadelphia newspaper Aurora, and that he had agreed to accept money
from Great Britain to do so. 85 During the trial in the New York Court of Oyer and

Terminer, the judge refused to allow Hamilton to testify as to the falsity of the alleged

libels, even though both parties agreed to admit the truth of the matter into evidence. The
judge declared that the law of libels imposed criminal liability without regard for the truth
or falsity of the publication, and reminded the jury that the case was “a prosecution under
the common law of our country, by which we and our ancestors had been governed from

the earliest times. . . .”86 Upon the jury’s finding that Frothingham was responsible for

85 Francis Wharton, State Trials of the United States During the Administrations of Washington
and Adams with References Historical and Professional and Preliminary Notes on the Politics of the Times
(New York: Burt Franklin, 1970), 649; For a discussion of the substance of the alleged libel and Hamilton’s
chagrin, sec Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 400-403, 406.
86 Wharton, State Trials. 650-651.
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publishing the statements regarding Hamilton, the court determined the matter to be
libelous and adjudged him guilty.87

The prosecution against Frothingham demonstrated not only the survival of

common-law seditious libel in New York law, but also its severity relative to the federal
Sedition Act, which permitted the truth of the alleged libel to be admitted into evidence

and the jury to determine the guilt of the accused. Although Frothingham’s alleged libels
occurred after the passage of the Sedition Act, Hamilton had to proceed at state common

law, as the federal act did not extend to personal libels directed against federal officials
other than Congress and the President. The Sedition Act was thus more limited in scope

than was the common law in New York.88

In 1803, two years after the expiration of the Sedition Act, New York prosecuted
another common-law seditious libel in the case of People v. Croswell. The state, under

the Republican administration of Governor George Clinton, indicted the Federalist printer

Harry Croswell for publishing accusations that Thomas Jefferson, while Vice-President,

had paid James T. Callender to libel George Washington and John Adams. The trial
court convicted Croswell, and followed the common law by refusing to admit evidence as

to the truth of the alleged libels. Hamilton himself represented Croswell on his appeal
before the Supreme Court of New York, where he made a brilliant argument for the

inclusion of the Zcnger principles into the state’s law of seditious libel.

89

87 Ibid., 651; Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 406, 412-414; Levy also gives a brief summary of the
Frothingham case in Emergence of a Free Press, 254.

88 Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 406.
89 Janies T. Callender was a notorious Republican publisher, who had himself been convicted
under the Sedition Act and subsequently pardoned by President Jefferson, Levy, Emergence of ct Free
Press, 338-339.
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Hamilton’s understanding of New York law on seditious libel, as argued on
Croswell’s behalf, was consistent with the procedural reforms introduced in the Zenger
case and codified in the Sedition Act. Hamilton cited English precedent for the

proposition that the common law of libel had originally permitted the admission into

evidence of the truth of the matter published, and the determination of both fact and law
by the jury. The Star Chamber subsequently distorted the common law, Hamilton

submitted to the Court, with absolutist doctrine. Although supporting a procedural

liberalization of the common law, however, Hamilton did not dispute its substance.90
Hamilton further argued for the application of the common law in interpreting the United
States Constitution:
He [Hamilton] maintained that the common law applied to the United
States. That the common law was principally the application of natural law to the
state and condition of society. That the constitution of the United States used the
terms and ideas which had a reference to the common law, and were inexplicable
without its aid. That the definition of treason, of the writ of habeas corpus, of
crimes and misdemeanors, &c. were all to be expounded by the rules of the
common law. That the constitution would be frittered away or borne down by
factions, (the evil genii, the pests of republics,) if the common law was not
applicable. . . . That if we departed from common law principles, we should
degenerate into anarchy, and become the sport of the fury of conflicting
passions. 91

Hamilton’s argument in Croswell demonstrated three significant points about Federalist

jurisprudence on the liberty of the press. First, Hamilton found the substantive law of

seditious libel to be necessary to the maintenance of an ordered society. Second,
Hamilton’s advocacy of the procedural reforms found in the Zenger case and the Sedition

90 From People v. Croswell, reprinted in Levy, Freedom of the Press, 379-384; Alexander
Hamilton’s argument in Croswell essentially built upon that ol Andrew Hamilton in the Zenger case.

91 Levy, Freedom of the Press, 384-385.
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Act demonstrated a willingness to reform the English common law.92 Third, Hamilton
strongly expressed the Federalist view that the common law stood as a rule of

construction for the Constitution.
The justices of the New York Supreme Court divided evenly on their opinion in

the case. Consequently, Croswell did not receive a new trial, wherein he could admit into

evidence the truth of the alleged libel. Justice James Kent, however, wrote an

independent opinion agreeing with Hamilton’s argument.93 Kent stated that the common
law originally allowed the admission of truth into evidence before the Star Chamber

corrupted it. He also believed that the jury had the responsibility for deciding the
criminal intent, and thus the guilt, of the accused.94 Distinguishing between English and

American standards for the freedom of the press, Kent found the federal Sedition Act to

reflect a distinctly American law of the press.95 He thereby supported a modification of
the English common law of seditious libel, while maintaining its essence:

I am far from intending that these authorities mean, by the freedom of the
press, a press wholly beyond the reach of the law, for this would be emphatically
Pandora’s box, the source of every evil. . . . Against such a commentary upon the
freedom of the American press, I beg leave to enter my protest. The founders of
our governments were loo wise and too just, ever to have intended, by the
freedom of the press, a right to circulate falsehood as well as truth, or that the
press should be the lawful vehicle of malicious defamation, or an engine for evil
and designing men, to cherish, for mischievous purposes, sedition, irreligion, and

92 Hamilton’s advocacy of the Zcngcr principles may have been very well sincere. As mentioned
at page 30 above, he stipulated as the complainant in Frothingham to the defendant’s admission of truth
into evidence.
93 James Kent would later publish Commentaries on American Law, a popular treatise of early
American jurisprudence.

91 See Kent’s opinion generally, reprinted in Levy, Freedom of the Press, 388-399.
95 Ibid., 396-398; Kent’s finding that the Sedition Act represented a distinct American common
law of seditious libel comports with Congressman Dana’s statement to the effect that the Zcngcr principles
applied in federal seditious libel prosecutions, even in the absence of a statutory declaration. Sec page 25
above.
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impurity. Such an abuse of the press would be incompatible with the existence
and good order of civil society.96

Kent’s opinion, though not the decision of the case, distinguished the American common
law of seditious libel from that of England. Kent additionally found the Sedition Act to
be a statutory representation of the American common law of the freedom of the press.
The arguments of Hamilton and Kent suggest that the common law of seditious libel was

undergoing a transformation in the United Slates, as some Americans believed it
incorporated the Zengcr principles. Nevertheless, both the judge of the lower trial court

and two other justices of the New York Supreme Court followed the unmodified English

common law in deciding the case. Croswell shows that, at least in New York, the legal
controversy over common-law seditious libel continued into the early nineteenth century

to concern its procedural, not substantive, provisions.
Although Pennsylvania had constitutional press clauses, its law on seditious libel

differed from New York only by embracing the Zenger principles. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania interpreted the press guarantee from the state’s 1776 constitution

according to the common law in the 1788 case of Respublica v. Oswald.

98

The state of

Pennsylvania brought an indictment before the state Supreme Court against Eleazar

Oswald for printing a criminal libel upon a private individual. The Court subsequently
released Oswald upon bail pending trial. While on bail, Oswald published a scathing

96 Levy, Freedom of the Press, 398-399.
97 Levy found the Zengcr principles to be the center of libertarian press theory until the Sedition
Act controversy occasioned new Republican ideas about the freedom of the press. Legal reform, however,
continued to focus upon the Zengcr principles long after Republicans introduced a more radical free press
concept into American political thought. Levy, “Liberty and the First Amendment, 23-24, 32-33.

98 1 Dallas 319; For the text of Pennsylvania’s 1776 press clause, sec note 80 above; During the
House debates on the sedition bill, Otis cited Oswald in support of a common-law understanding of the
freedom of the press. Annals, 5th Cong., 2d Scss., 2149.
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attack upon the Court, charging it with being biased and politically motivated in his

case. 99 Oswald likewise condemned the doctrine of criminal libel as pernicious and

contrary to democratic government. Incensed by Oswald’s publication of another libel

while awaiting trial for the same offense, the Court ordered his arrest for contempt. At
the contempt hearing, Oswald’s legal counsel argued that the criminal law of libel in
Pennsylvania did not prevent citizens from publishing criticisms of all branches of the

government, including the judiciary.100 The Court disagreed and found Oswald guilty of
contempt. Chief Justice Thomas McKean explained in a written decision that

Pennsylvania’s constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press “effectually preclude
any attempt to fetter the press by the institution of a licenser. The same principles were
settled in England, so far back as the reign of William the Third. . . ,”101 The Court found

that Oswald’s published attacks upon its impartiality were libelous, and so constituted a

contempt of the Court in light of his pending trial for another libel.

After the contempt ruling, Oswald complained to the Pennnsylvania legislature
that it should impeach McKean and the other justices for violating the state constitution’s

guarantee of the freedom of the press. The state Assembly agreed to debate the charges.
William Lewis, Oswald’s prosecutor, addressed the Assembly on behalf of the state’s

Supreme Court during the impeachment proceedings. In his statements, Lewis

unequivocally declared the purpose of the stale’s free press clause:
If, indeed, this section of the bill of rights had not circumscribed the authority of
the legislature, this house, being a single branch, might in a despotic paroxism,
revive all the odious restraints, which disgraced early annals of the British
99 Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 210-211; The substance of Oswald’s contemptuous
publication is found at 1 Dallas at 319-320..
100 Ibid., 322.

101 Ibid., 325.

36

government. Hence, arises the great fundamental advantage of the provision,
which the authors of the constitution have wisely interwoven with our political
system; not, it appears, to tolerate and indulge the passions and animosities of
individuals, but effectually to protect the citizens from the encroachments of men
•
in
power. 102
The Pennsylvania Assembly subsequently refused to impeach the judges.103 In Oswald

and the resultant impeachment proceedings before the state Assembly, McKean and
Lewis both interpreted Pennsylvania’s 1776 free press clause according to the common

law. To them, such a constitutional provision did no more than restrain the legislature

from licensing the press, and in no way abolished the crime of seditious libel.
In 1790, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution, with a revised guarantee of the

freedom of the press. Unlike the simple press clause of the 1776 constitution, the 1790

version clearly defined the liberty of the press according to the common law. In
prosecutions for libel, the constitution specifically admitted into evidence the truth of the

matter published, and allowed the jury to determine the law.104 The Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania addressed the new clause in the 1805 case of Respublica v. Dennie}05 In
that case, the state prosecuted the radical Federalist Joseph Dennie before its Supreme

Court for publishing heated denunciations of democracy in the Philadelphia newspaper,
the Port Folio. Justice Jaspar Yeates, citing Hamilton’s argument in Croswell.

summarized in his charge to the jury the law of seditious libel and its proscription of
malicious writings. “Publish as you please in the first instance without control,”
explained Yeates, “but you are answerable both to the community and the individual, if

102

Lewis' address to the Pennsylvania Assembly, reprinted in Levy, Freedom of the Press. 141.

103

Levy, Emergence of a Free Press. 211.

10-1

For the text of the press clause in the 1790 Pennsylvania constitution, sec note 80 above.

105

4 Yeates 267.
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you proceed to unwarrantable lengths.”106 The jury, however, returned a verdict of not
guilty. The verdict notwithstanding, Justice Yeates’ jury charge gives further evidence

that both of Pennsylvania’s early constitutional guarantees only re-affirmed the

substantive common law of the freedom of the press.
The law of the other states indicated no repudiation of the common-law
understanding of the liberty of the press.107 The New York case of Frothingham and the

Pennsylvania case of Oswald are prime examples of how state law supported Federalist
arguments that the common law defined the freedom of the press under the First

Amendment. The cases of Croswell and Dennie, decided after the Sedition Act had
expired, show that the Republican view of the First Amendment as an absolute

prohibition on all federal press regulations failed to influence the status of seditious libel

in state jurisprudence. These cases show that during the period of the Sedition Act
controversy the substantive law of seditious libel in New York and Pennsylvania

remained unchanged. In both states, the common law continued to define the freedom of
the press, and the issue of libertarian reform still centered upon the procedural aspects

introduced in the Zenger case and codified in the Sedition Act itself. Pennsylvania

jurisprudence, in particular, provides an example of how Federalists intended to use the
common law as a method of interpreting the First Amendment.

3. Federalist Textualism: The Sedition Act as Necessary and Proper

In addition to advocating the existence of a federal common law of seditious libel,

Federalists claimed that Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution granted Congress the

106 Ibid., 269-270.

107 Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 183; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The
Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 46.
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authority to enact sedition legislation. Article I, Section 8 enumerated the several powers

of Congress, including its authority to make “all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer

thereof.” Federalists interpreted this clause broadly to give wide discretion to Congress

in enacting legislation on any subject it deemed material to national interests.
Federalists applied the common law in determining the extent of congressional

authority under the necessary and proper clause. Even if the Constitution did not create
an inherent common-law jurisdiction in the federal courts, the common law still defined
the parameters within which Congress could legislate. In other words, if the federal

government could not prosecute seditious libel without a statute, the necessary and proper

clause still authorized Congress to pass a sedition act otherwise conforming to the terms
of the common law. Whether Federalists based federal jurisdiction upon either the

common law itself or the necessary and proper clause, they used the common law in both
instances as a rule of constitutional construction.
Congress itself used the necessary and proper clause as a justification for the

constitutionality of the Sedition Act. In a 1799 report on the Alien and Sedition Acts,

Congress asserted that “a law to punish false, scandalous, and malicious writings against
the government, with intent to stir up sedition, is a law necessary for carrying into effect
the power vested by the Constitution in the government of the United Slates, and in the

officers and departments thereof. . . .”

108

Congressman Allen had previously expressed

this sentiment during the debates on the sedition bill in the House of Representatives. He

108 Elliot, Debates, 4:441.
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believed that seditious libels threatened the survival of ordered government, and that the
government’s suppression of the licentiousness of the press was “necessary to its

preservation.”109 Allen and his Federalist colleagues emphasized the dangerous
tendencies of seditious libels in justifying not only federal common-law jurisdiction, but

also congressional action under the necessary and proper clause. In its reply to the
Virginia Resolutions, the Massachusetts legislature defended the constitutionality of the
Sedition Act by also finding it necessary and proper to effect the general purposes of the
national government.110 Connecticut likewise responded to Virginia by defending the

Sedition Act as a law “which the exigency of the country rendered necessary,” while

New Hampshire found it “in the present critical situation of our country, highly

expedient.”111
In justifying seditious libel by the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution,
Federalists were taking a significant step in adapting seditious libel to the jurisprudence

of a written constitution. The justification of seditious libel under both the common law
and Article I, Section 8 was identical. Government could prosecute seditious libels at
common law through a natural right of self-preservation. This same need made seditious
libel necessary and proper under the Constitution. The Federalists’ necessary and proper

argument, while very much intertwined with the common-law justification of self
preservation, was distinctly grounded in the text of the Constitution.

109

Annals, 5th Cong., 2d Scss., 2101.

no

Counter-resolution of Massachusetts, February 9, 1799, in Virginia Report, 172.

111 Counter-resolution of Connecticut, in Ibid., 175; Counter-resolution of New Hampshire, June
14, 1799, in Ibid., 176.
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4. A Summary of Federalist Arguments

Federalists articulated two basic arguments supporting federal jurisdiction
over seditious libel. The first argument advocated a federal common law, placing in the

judiciary an inherent criminal jurisdiction over seditious libel. Federal prosecutions for

seditious libel thereby did not need to rely on any congressional statute. Such common
law authority was co-existent with government itself, out of a right of self-preservation.

Federalists additionally found that Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution implied such
common-law jurisdiction by its extension of the judicial power to all cases in law and

equity. Federalists, however, found an alternative textual justification for the
constitutionality of the Sedition Act, rather than relying solely on the existence of a

federal common law. Federalists argued seditious libel to be necessary and proper under
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution for protecting the survival of the state. Even if the

national government could not prosecute seditious libel without a statute, because no
federal common law existed, Congress nevertheless had the authority to pass a sedition
law. A congressional act might be required to create a federal crime, but Congress’
legislative authority under the necessary and proper clause was co-extensive with the
limits of the common law. Whether establishing jurisdiction over seditious libel by either

federal common law or the necessary and proper clause, Federalists still used the
common law as a means of constitutional construction. The First Amendment was,
therefore, only declaratory of the common-law meaning of the freedom of the press, thus

prohibiting prior restraint by Congress, but allowing seditious libel prosecutions.

Through their arguments, Federalists began to shift the theoretical foundations of
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seditious libel from the unwritten common law to the jurisprudence of a written and
supreme constitution.
C. The Alternative Vision: Republican First Amendment Theory

Republicans espoused a radically different interpretation of the First Amendment
press clause from the Federalists. Both Federalists and Republicans shared the view that

this clause was a restraint on congressional power. The fundamental disagreement

between the two parties instead centered upon the meaning of freedom of the press.
Rather than defining the First Amendment by the common law, Republicans insisted that
it was a prohibition against any federal legislation whatsoever regarding the press.

Republicans advocated at the federal level a new concept of the freedom of the press that
was absolute, and thereby supported a radical departure from traditional Anglo-American
jurisprudence on the issue.

I 17

Strictly construing the Constitution, Republicans denied

both the existence of a federal common law, and that the necessary and proper clause

empowered Congress to pass a sedition law. An examination of Republican arguments

against the constitutionality of the Sedition Act, however, show that they were primarily
concerned with preserving states’ rights and, therefore, failed to discredit the underlying

principles of common-law seditious libel.

In both the congressional debates on the Sedition Act and the subsequent public

112 Levy argues that Republican critics of the Sedition Act first articulated such a libertarian
concept of the freedom of the press, disputing Schofield’s and Chafcc’s thesis that the founders had earlier
rejected common-law seditious libel. Levy also points out that the Zcngcr principles were still progressive
until Republicans introduced a more radical concept of the freedom of the press. In any case, Republicans
publicly articulated a broadly libertarian press theory in an attempt to refute the constitutional arguments of
the Federalists. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, xii, 297. Berns suggests that Republicans began to
question the substantive concept of seditious libel at all only after they encountered difficulty promoting
their stales’ rights arguments. Boms, “Freedom of the Press,’ in Supreme Court Review, 135. Koch and
Ammon, however, clearly believe that Republican arguments, as expressed in the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions, were predominantly concerned with defending civil liberties. Koch and Ammon, Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions,” 174.
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controversy, Republicans refuted the existence of a federal common law. The judiciary,
they argued, had no inherent jurisdiction over common law crimes, nor did the common
law define the freedom of the press. Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, the Republican

leader in the House of Representatives, made this point during the debates on the sedition
bill. Gallatin noted that the framers could not have decided upon a national common law,

because the several states had modified it within their jurisdictions.113 Gallatin also
denied that the text of the Constitution implied a federal common law. Article III,
Section 2, extending the judicial power to all cases in law and equity arising under the
Constitution, applied only to controversies regarding the interpretation or application of
constitutional provisions. It did not authorize common-law jurisdiction in the federal
. 1
courts.

The national government also did not have an inherent right to prosecute

seditious libel at common law or pass a sedition statute. Furthermore, the necessary and

proper clause only permitted legislation effecting the expressly delegated powers of
Congress, which in no case allowed a sedition law. Contrary interpretations, Gallatin

argued, greatly extended federal power.115 The First Amendment was instead an absolute

restriction on any federal jurisdiction whatsoever over the press, and re-affirmed the
Constitution’s limited grant of power to the national government.

Gallatin’s remarks in the House set forth the main points of subsequent
Republican opposition to the constitutionality of the Sedition Act. In the Virginia Report

of 1799, the state’s legislature essentially repeated Gallatin’s arguments in its opposition

113 Annals, 5th Cong., 2d Scss., 2162-2163.

1,4 Ibid., 2157.
115 Ibid., 2159.
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to the Sedition Act. The Virginia legislature pointed out that the common law differed
among the stales, which had never shared a general corpus of common law to which the

Constitution could refer. The national government, it stressed, had only those powers
expressly delegated by the Constitution, which did not include common-law jurisdiction.

Finally, the Constitution’s grant of judicial jurisdiction to all cases in “law and equity”

contemplated only civil, but not criminal, actions.116 The Virginia Report likewise

denied that the Sedition Act was necessary and proper under the Constitution, as it was
not “properly an incident to an express power, and necessary to its execution.” Jefferson,

in his draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, had earlier expressed the view that Article I,
Section 8 was “subsidiary only to the execution of limited powers. . .

1 i

Republicans

thus advocated a strict interpretation of the Constitution that greatly limited federal
authority.
Republican opposition to the Sedition Act fundamentally relied upon the

principles of federalism and the restriction of national power. The Kentucky and Virginia
,

Resolutions best illustrate the Republicans’ concerns for stales’ rights.

118

The Virginia

legislature appended a public address to its resolutions of 1798, in which it condemned
the sudden enlargement of congressional powers as a “death-wound on the sovereignty of

the slates.”119 In their resolutions, both states declared the Sedition Act to be

unconstitutional, and urged other states to join in their condemnation of the Act. While

116 Virginia Report, 211-219.

1,7 Ibid., 218; “Kentucky Resolutions,” in Thomas Jefferson: Writings, cd. Merrill D. Peterson
(New York: Library of America, 1984), 452.
118 Jefferson drafted the resolutions passed by the legislature of Kentucky, while Madison drafted
those adopted by the legislature of Virginia.
119 Elliot, Debates, 4:530.
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Virginia, however, threatened no overt action in opposition to the Alien and Sedition
laws, Kentucky ominously introduced the doctrine of nullification.120 The Constitution
was a compact between states, Kentucky’s legislature stated, and each state could judge

for itself whether a congressional act was constitutional. A state therefore reserved the
right to declare unconstitutional acts of the national government as void and of no force
within its jurisdiction.121 Kentucky and Virginia were clearly not as concerned with
individual liberties or a libertarian free press theory as much as they sought to protect
their own rights against perceived encroachments by the national government.

Republicans continued to assert state authority to prosecute seditious libel, while
simultaneously denying the same power to the federal government. Through the limited
nature of the Constitution, argued Thomas Jefferson in the Kentucky Resolutions, the

states had expressed “their determination to retain to themselves the right of judging how
far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged without lessening their

useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be separated from their use
should be tolerated, rather than the use be destroyed.”

122

During the House debates on

the sedition bill, Edward Livingston made it clear that “every man who shall publish a

libel on any part of the Government, is liable to punishment. . . by laws passed by the

120 Resolutions of Virginia, in Virginia Report, 22-23; Resolutions of Kentucky Legislature, in
Ibid., 162-167; Koch and Ammon discuss more closely the differences between Madison and Jefferson on
nullification, as expressed in their Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. Koch and Ammon, Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions,”157-162.

121 Resolutions of Kentucky Legislature, in Virginia Report, 162, 166-167.
122 “Kentucky Resolutions,” in Jefferson: Writings, 450; Levy has argued that Jefferson s
commitment to individual liberty was less than ideal, and he fully supported state prosecutions for seditious
libel. “Jefferson . . . never protested against the substantive law of seditious libel, not even during the
Sedition Act controversy. His protests at that lime were directed against national as opposed to state
prosecution for verbal crimes.” Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side (Chicago. Ivan R.
Dec, 1963), 46.
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several States.”123 The cases of Croswell and Dennie show that Republicans were just as
prepared as Federalists to charge political opponents with seditious libel under state law.

Republicans primarily objected to the Sedition Act on the grounds of states’ rights, and

not from opposition to the concept of seditious libel.
The Republican interpretation of the First Amendment depended upon a

fundamental distinction between the nature of state and federal sovereignty.124 Whereas
Federalist arguments emphasized the consistency of a common understanding of the
freedom of the press in both state and federal jurisprudence, Republicans erected a clear
division between the two. States retained an extensive police power within their

jurisdiction, and their governments were free to retain the full common law of England,
including seditious libel. Republicans did not reject the concept of seditious libel as a
legal doctrine so much as they found it utterly incompatible with the constitutional

structure of limited national government.
Republicans did buttress their states’ rights arguments with statements that the

American concept of the freedom of the press was more expansive than the common law.

In a general reflection upon the propriety of seditious libel in the United States, the
Virginia legislature declared in its 1799 Report:

This idea of the freedom of the press, can never be admitted to be the American
idea of it: since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications, would have a
similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them. It would seem
a mockery to say, that no law should be passed, preventing publications from
being made, but that laws might be passed for punishing them in case they should
i
i
1^5
be made. ~
123 Armais, 5lh Cong., 2d Sess., 2153.

124 Gallatin made this distinction clear in his comments during the House debates on the sedition
bill. Ibid., 2158.
125 Virginia Report, 220.
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The Virginia legislature took no actions repudiating state restrictions on the press,

however, and remained preoccupied with states’ rights throughout its 1799 Report, just as

it had in its resolutions of the previous year. By prioritizing states’ rights over abstract
press theory, the Virginia legislature failed to attack effectively the fundamental principle
of seditious libel in both federal and state jurisprudence. Thomas McKean, when

speaking in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, had expressed a similar sentiment that
seditious libel was not “essential to liberty,” except in monarchical Great Britain, and was
incompatible with Congress’ enumerated powers in the Constitution.126 McKean’s later

defense of the seditious libel doctrine while presiding as judge over the 1797

Pennsylvania trial of William Cobbett, however, suggests that he also spoke of an
expanded freedom of the press only in the context of the national government. 127
The Republican distinction between federal and state law on the freedom of the

press weakened any progressive expressions of First Amendment theory. By not

rejecting outright the substantive doctrine of seditious libel under both the Constitution
and state law, Republicans failed to prevent its survival in American legal thought.
Seditious libel remained entrenched in state jurisprudence, where it could continue to
shape the understanding of the freedom of the press within the American legal profession.
III.

Seditious Libel in Early Federal Case Law and Legal Scholarship

Throughout the colonial and Revolutionary periods, the common law’s

dependence upon established traditions and precedent made it resilient to change. The
common law was not just a corpus of law, but it was also a system of political and legal

126 Elliot, Debates, 2:540.
127 Wharton, Stale Trials, 322.
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thought influencing the framers of the Constitution and other Americans.128 Federalists

continued to rely upon the common law in construing the Constitution, thus endorsing a
conservative constitutional jurisprudence rooted in past Anglo-American legal practice.

Early American jurists, many of whom were Federalists, also used the common law to

define the First Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution.129

A. The Courts and a Federal Common Law of Crimes
In the 1790s, federal courts addressed the question of whether a federal common

law of crimes was constitutional. This issue was highly relevant to the Sedition Act, as it
would determine whether the judiciary possessed an inherent jurisdiction over seditious

libel, and to what extent Congress might pass sedition legislation. Because the Judicial

Act of 1789 required each Circuit Court to be comprised of a federal judge and an

assigned Supreme Court justice, the Circuit cases are an important indicator of the
Supreme Court’s possible attitude towards seditious libel.130 The cases of United States

v. Smith and United States v. Worrall particularly frame the controversy over a federal

criminal common law, and show how some jurists struggled to integrate the common law
with the written Constitution.131 Federalists faced the same challenge when giving a
common-law meaning to the First Amendment’s press clause in order to establish federal

jurisdiction over seditious libel.

128 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture al
Williamsburg, Virginia, 1998), 9-10; Lawrence M. Friedman, A History' ofAmerican Law, 2d cd. (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 109-110; Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 30-31.

129 Pole, “Reflections on American Law,” 148; Presser, “Supra-Constilulion,” 330, 335; Levy,
Emergence of a Free Press, 269, 275.

130 1 Stat. 73.
131 27 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1797) (No. 16, 323); 2 Dallas 384 (C.C.D. Penn. 1798).
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One of the early decisions supporting a federal common law of crimes was that of
the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts in United States v. Smith in 1797.132

The United States brought indictments against the defendants for counterfeiting bank

bills of the Bank of the United States. As there was no congressional statute establishing
the crime of counterfeiting, the government prosecuted the defendants at common law.

The defendants were subsequently convicted. The defense counsel moved the court to

arrest judgment, arguing that the government could not prosecute without statutory
authority, and that only state courts held common-law jurisdiction.
The Circuit Court, led by Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, denied the motion of the

defense. It instead ruled that it had jurisdiction in the case pursuant to Article III, Section
2, which extended the federal judicial power to all cases in law and equity arising under

the Constitution or the laws of the United States. The court observed that the defendants
had counterfeited notes of the national bank, an entity chartered under the laws of the
United States. Regarding Smith, the court explained:
132 27 F. Cas. 1147; The year for Smith is officially reported as 1792, but the manuscript record of
the case dales it at 1797. Prcycr, “Jurisdiction to Punish,” 229, n. 22; Levy, Emergence of a Free Press.
276; There were two other Circuit court cases decided prior to Smith that dealt with the issue of a federal
common law. The first was United States v. Henfield. 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Penn. 1793) (No. 6, 360), in
which the government obtained a conviction against Gideon Hcnficld for taking a commission on board an
armed French vessel and thereby participating in raids against British shipping. The prosecution against
Hcnficld was ostensibly based upon the common law, as no congressional statute criminalized Hcnficld’s
actions. The government’s argument, however, claimed that Hcnficld violated the American treaty of
peace with Great Britain and thus infringed upon Congress’ war-making powers. Incidentally, the later
case of United Slates v. Williams. 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17, 708), dealt with similar
facts and issues of law as Henfield. As Prcycr points out, however, both cases implicated international law
and American treaty obligations rather than domestic criminal acts. Although Henfield and Williams
might still demonstrate judicial endorsement of a federal common law, the role of international law in both
prosecutions distinguishes them from cases dealing directly with a domestic federal common law of crimes.
Sec Prcycr, “Jurisdiction to Punish,” 229-230. The 1794 case of United States v. Ravara. 27 F. Cas. 714
(C.C.D. Penn.) (No. 16, 122), arose from a common-law indictment against a consul from Genoa, who sent
a threatening letter to a British minister to the United Stales. Like Henfield and Williams. Ravara
implicated international law and so is arguably not demonstrative of judicial attitudes towards a domestic
federal common law of crimes. Julius Goebel, Jr. has also suggested that there was statutory support for
the prosecution against Ravara. Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801. vol. 1, History1 of
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This was a case arising under those laws, for those bills were made in virtue
thereof, though there was no statute describing or punishing the offense of
counterfeiting them; and therefore to counterfeit them was a contempt of and
misdemeanor against the United States, and punishable by them as such. . . ,133
Counterfeiting, under the Circuit Court’s ruling, interfered with a legitimate act of
Congress, and was therefore punishable at common law.
Although Smith did not concern seditious libel, it still stood for the proposition
that the federal government could prosecute common-law crimes in the absence of a

federal criminal statute. The Circuit Court’s assertion of jurisdiction is particularly

interesting. In overruling the defense motion for an arrest of judgment, the court claimed
common-law jurisdiction over the non-statutory crime of counterfeiting, while

simultaneously finding that this crime was ultimately derivative of the statute establishing

the national bank. While the counterfeiting charges in Smith were clearly non-statutory,
the Circuit Court’s reasoning demonstrates how early federal judges struggled to

reconcile common-law principles with the Constitution.

The federal Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania also recognized the
existence of a federal common law of crimes in the 1798 case of United States v.
Worrall.134 The United States indicted Robert Worrall for attempting to bribe Tench

Coxe, Commissioner of the Revenue for the United States, in order to gain a construction
contract on a lighthouse.

135

The government brought the indictment at common law, as

there was no federal statute proscribing bribery of the Commissioner of the Revenue.
the Supreme Court of the United States, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise (New York: Macmillan,
1971), 627.
133

27 F. Cas. al 1148.

134

2 Dallas 384.

135 Tench Coxe was acting under the direction of the Secretary ol the Treasury, whom Congress
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After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, Worrall’s defense attorney, Alexander J.
Dallas, moved in arrest of judgment.136 Dallas argued that it was “incumbent upon the
Prosecutor to shew [.nc], that an offer to bribe the Commissioner of the Revenue, is a

violation of some Constitutional, or Legislative, prohibition.”137 There was, according to
Dallas, no constitutional provisions regarding the offense charged. While recognizing the

authority of Congress to pass criminal legislation pursuant to either express constitutional
powers or the necessary and proper clause, Dallas noted that no federal law existed
defining the crime in question. Dallas refuted the notion that any action compromising

the fidelity of a federal official was punishable at law, absent express statute. Such a

doctrine would “inevitably overflow and destroy all the barriers between the judicial
authorities of the State and the general government.”

1

Nor could the government

prosecute bribery as a common-law offense. The Constitution, argued Dallas, contained

no language adopting a common law of the United States. Instead, Congress had to

define federal crimes by statute. Dallas conceded that “Congress had undoubtedly a
power to make a law, which should render it criminal to offer a bribe to the
Commissioner of the Revenue.” He continued, however, that Congress “not having made

the law, the crime is not recognized by the Federal Code, constitutional or legislative;
and, consequently, it is not a subject on which the Judicial authority of the Union can

operate.

,, 1 39

William Rawle, the federal prosecutor, responded to Dallas by emphasizing

authorized to contract for the construction of a lighthouse al Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. Ibid., 384-385.
136

Ibid., 388-389.

137

Ibid., 389.

138

Ibid.

139 Ibid., 391.
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the necessity of punishing individuals who enticed federal officials to breach their
fiduciary duties. Bribery was therefore a federal crime
cri under common-law principles,

and within the purview of the courts.140
The Circuit Court was of divided opinion as to whether the federal judiciary

possessed common-law jurisdiction in the case. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase
stated in his opinion that Congress had authority under the necessary and proper clause to

make bribery of a federal official a criminal act. In the absence of a criminal statute,

however, the government could not prosecute. Chase unequivocally declared that “the

United States, as a Federal government, have no common law; and, consequently, no
indictment can be maintained in their Courts, for offences merely at the common law.”141

Chase acknowledged that state common law would apply to civil suits in federal courts
between private citizens, but insisted that the Constitution created no federal common

law in criminal matters. Furthermore, the disparities between the common law of

England and the several states precluded the establishment of a uniform federal common
law.142

Judge Richard Peters disagreed with Chase, finding that any act subversive of a
federal institution or corruptive of a federal official was an offense punishable in federal
courts. This authority was inherent in the judiciary, Peters believed, because “whenever a

government has been established,... a power to preserve itself, was a necessary, and an

140 Ibid., 392; Dallas and Rawlc discussed the cases of Henfield and Ravara in supporting their
arguments. Rawlc argued that both cases were precedent for a federal common law of crimes. Dallas,
however, argued that in Henfield federal jurisdiction was premised upon a treaty of the United States, while
in Ravara it was due to the defendant’s position as a foreign consul. Ibid., 391-393. Sec note 132 above.
141 Ibid., 394.
142 Ibid., 393-395.
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inseparable, concomitant.”143 The opinion of the Circuit Court was therefore divided.

Despite the wish of the Court and the prosecuting attorney to refer the case to the

Supreme Court, the counsel for the defendant refused to appeal. Chase and Peters
subsequently consulted and decided to reduce Worrall’s sentence. Although Justice
Chase made a strong argument against a federal common law, his opinion did not
discount the possibility of congressional criminal legislation co-extensive with common-

law definitions. In any case, the opinion of Judge Peters shows that some jurists were
prepared to uncompromisingly accept a federal common law of crimes, which would

likely include seditious libel.
The cases of Smith and Worrall show that lower federal courts struggled with the

issue of a federal common law of crimes. Because the Judiciary Act provided that
Supreme Court justices were to sit on the Circuit Courts, the decisions of these courts

suggest that the Supreme Court of the 1790s may have considered a federal common law

to be constitutional. The opinions in Smith and Worrall. however, also illustrate how
jurists tackled the problem of applying common-law principles to the requirements of a
written and supreme constitution. The court in Smith extrapolated the need to punish

counterfeiting, without a federal criminal statute, because it undermined the purposes of

the congressional act establishing the Bank of the United States. The federal prosecution
at common law, therefore, still maintained a tenuous foundation on an act of Congress.

The federal prosecutor in Worrall followed this reasoning in supporting the indictment in

the case, citing the need to prosecute common-law bribery because it corrupted the holder

143 Ibid., 395.

53

of a federal office created by congressional legislation.144 This theoretical approach
differed subtly, but significantly, from the reasoning of Judge Peters in Worrall that the

government had an inherent authority to punish common-law crimes.

Although Justice

Chase denied in Worrall the existence of a federal common law, his opinion left open the

possibility that Congress could statutorily enact crimes defined by the common law.

Smith and Worrall show that jurists were attempting to bridge the theoretical gap between
a common-law jurisdiction and the need to conform to a written constitution. This

theoretical problem would again appear in the controversy over the Sedition Act, and the

Federalists’ attempt to reconcile the common-law doctrine of seditious libel with the First
Amendment’s press clause.

B. The Sedition Act in Judicial Practice

While Federalists and Republicans were waging a political battle over the
Sedition Act, federal courts had the task of either enforcing the law or declaring it
, 145

unconstitutional.

Considering that the Circuit Courts had already entertained common

law prosecutions on several occasions, it is not surprising that they would more readily

accept the constitutionality of a statutorily defined crime. While the federal government

brought some seditious libel actions solely at common law, there were fourteen
prosecutions under section two of the Sedition Act.146 The cases of Matthew Lyon,

144 Rawlc’s main argument, as well as the opinion offered by Judge Peters, was that common-law
jurisdiction in the federal judiciary was inherent with the establishment of lawful government, and that
government’s need for self-preservation. Ibid., 392-393, 395.
145 The doctrine of judicial review, allowing both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to
strike down legislation violating the Constitution, was already well-established by 1798. Scott Douglas
Gerber, “Introduction: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall,” in Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before
John Marshall. cd. Scott Douglas Gerber (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 9-11.
146 There were one federal grand jury presenunent and two, possibly three, prosecutions for
seditious libel brought at common law. Smith, Freedom's Fetters. 185; Goebel, Antecedents and
Beginnings. 638, n. 107.
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Thomas Cooper, and James Callender, the most notorious trials under the Sedition Act,
best illustrate how Supreme Court justices on Circuit interpreted the freedom of the press

consistently with the common law.
Even before the passage of the Sedition Act, there were federal common-law

actions against prominent Republican writers for seditious libel. In 1797, shortly after

Adam’s inauguration, a federal grand jury in Virginia issued a presentment against the

Republican congressman Samuel Cabell for criticizing the President in writings to his
constituents. The government, however, never initiated a prosecution against Cabell.147

The second action was a common-law indictment of June, 1798, against Benjamin

Franklin Bache, the publisher of the foremost Republican newspaper in the nation, the
Philadelphia Aurora. Bache would die of yellow fever before he could stand trial.148 The

government also charged John Daly Burk, the Republican editor of the New York Time

Piece, with common-law seditious libel in early July, 1798, just before passage of the
Sedition Act. Burk subsequently negotiated a deal with the government agreeing to leave

the country in exchange for a dismissal of the charges.149

A third seditious libel prosecution may also have been at common law, although
the nature of the charges is not clear. The government charged William Durrell, the
publisher of a New York newspaper, with seditious libel several days after the passage of

the Sedition Act. Durrell had made the alleged libel, however, previously to the Act’s
passage. Noting that the case records do not specify the basis of the indictment, Smith

147

Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 95; Koch and Ammon, “Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions,” 152-

148

Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 188-189, 203-204.

153.

149 Rather than emigrating, however, Burk remained in hiding in the United Stales. Ibid., 211,217218.
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surmises that the prosecution must have been at common law. A charge under the
Sedition Act for statements made before its enactment, argues Smith, likely would have

violated the constitutional provision against ex post facto laws. Whether tried under the
common law or the Sedition Act, Durrell was convicted after a jury trial presided over by

Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington.150 The above examples, especially the

prosecutions of Bache and Burk, show that federal courts accepted the common law to
establish federal jurisdiction over seditious libel, as well as to define the freedom of the

press.
The first prosecution under the Sedition Act occurred about three months after its

passage, and was clearly political in nature. In October, 1798, the grand jury for the
federal Circuit for the District of Vermont indicted local congressman Matthew Lyon

under the Sedition Act. The indictment charged Lyon for both writing and publishing

libels against the President.151 As he was unable to secure legal counsel in time for the

trial, Lyon represented himself. Lyon initially objected to the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction

based on the unconstitutionality of the law, but Supreme Court Justice William Paterson

refused the plea. Lyon based his subsequent defense on the unconstitutionality of the
law, his lack of malicious intent, and the truth of the matter published.

152

In his charge to

the jury, however, Paterson instructed the jurors to disregard Lyon’s argument that the

150 Ibid., 385-388.
151 Wharton, State Trials, 333-334; Lyon was al the time of the indictment running for re-election
to the House of Representatives. The indictment charged Lyon with writing an inflammatory letter to a
local paper in which, among other things, he relcrrcd to President Adams as having unbounded thirst for
ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice.” The indictment also charged Lyon with publishing
in his own newspaper a libelous letter written by a third person. Smith, Freedom s Fetters, 227-230.

152 As evidence that his statements regarding the President’s pretensions were true, Lyon actually
questioned Justice Paterson, who personally knew Adams. As might be expected, Paterson denied that
Adams displayed any “pomp and parade.” Lyon apparently olfcrcd no other evidence in his defense, and
was unable to prove the truth of his publication. Ibid., 233-234.
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law was unconstitutional.153 “You have nothing whatever to do with the constitutionality

or unconstitutionality of the sedition law,” explained Paterson. “Great would be the
abuses were the constitutionality of every statute to be submitted to a jury, in each case

where the statute is to be applied.”154 After short deliberation, the jury convicted
Lyon.155

Federalists no doubt had political motives in supporting an indictment of Lyon.
While scholars have criticized the Federalists for using the Sedition Act for partisan

purposes, political opinion was inseparable from the concept of seditious libel. As
Republicans aggressively opposed government policies, and supported reconciliation

with France, Federalists could easily see them as a threat to republican government as
they understood it.156 The prosecution of Congressman Lyon proves that the Federalists

were very serious about zealously enforcing the Sedition Act. Nothing about Lyon’s

trial, however, suggests that the government or the court acted illegally or inappropriately

within the conservative context of Federalist jurisprudence. Justice Paterson’s refusal to

153

Ibid., 231-234.

154

Wharton, State Trials, 336.

155 Ibid.; Despite imprisonment for his conviction, Lyon successfully won re-election io the House
of Representatives. Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 235, 238, 241; While Lyon’s prosecution under the Sedition
Act recks of political partisanship, it docs illustrate an interesting iacct about the traditional notion of the
freedom of the press and the Federalist understanding of representative government. Although he was a
congressman seeking re-election, Lyon still had no legal privilege to criticize publicly government officials
or policy. Such a right was limited to legislative sessions, where representatives traditionally had immunity
for all comments made in the course of debate. The framers included Article I, Section 6 in the
Constitution guaranteeing immunity for comments made in Congress, suggesting that they feared the
partisan abuse of libel proceedings. Federalists were not prepared to tolerate “libelous” publications even
during a congressional campaign, as criticisms of the government were unnecessary to inform the electorate
about the candidates. Rather than judging for themselves the propriety of specific government policies,
voters were simply to choose representatives based on any prior record in the legislature, and their own
personal qualifications. Such a theory of representation both reduced the role of the public in influencing
government policy, and supposedly dissuaded the development of factions. Martin, ‘ Federalist Theory oi
Representation,” 143, 166-168, 173-174.
156 Ibid., 146-150; Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 298-300.

57

allow Lyon to plead the unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act to the jury did not show
any judicial bias, but stood for the right of the judiciary to expound the Constitution. The
Lyon trial, while having definite political implications, merely exemplified the

Federalists’ extremely conservative understanding of the freedom of the press.
Two other notorious prosecutions under the Sedition Act occurred during the

presidential campaign year of 1800. In April of that year, the government arrested
Thomas Cooper for libeling President Adams. The indictment, brought in the Circuit

Court for the District of Pennsylvania, was based upon a handbill written and distributed

by Cooper in November, 1799, in which he criticized Adam’s support of military

expenditures, a national debt, and hostile relations with France. Cooper also condemned
Adams for extraditing to Great Britain Jonathan Robbins, an American citizen who had
served and mutinied on board a British warship. 157 The government, however, did not
prosecute Cooper immediately following his publication. Instead, it indicted him soon
after he refused to serve as legal counsel to the Republican printer William Duane, who

was ordered by the Senate to appear before it to answer charges of publishing accounts of

the chamber’s legislative business. In a letter to Duane, Cooper criticized the Senate’s
actions and the restrictions that it placed upon defense counsel in contesting the legality

of the proceedings. 158
The Duane affair places Cooper’s own prosecution in a decidedly political

context. The Senate investigation of Duane also illustrates the Federalists sensitivity to
criticism, as well as their conservative view of representative politics. The Federalist

157 Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 313-314, 316.
158 Ibid., 296-297, 315-316.
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controlled Senate attempted to try Duane legislatively for publishing reports in the

Philadelphia Aurora about a proposed bill that would have created a congressional

committee to review the validity of presidential electoral votes. Republicans saw the
measure as an attempt to influence improperly the forthcoming presidential election.
Federalist Senators justified the action against Duane by claiming that the Senate enjoyed

certain privileges necessary for the execution of its constitutional duties. Among these
privileges, they argued, was the right to investigate and punish unauthorized publications

of Senate proceedings.159
The Senate allowed Duane to retain legal counsel on the condition that they could

answer the Senate’s charges, but not dispute its jurisdiction in the case. Duane’s
attorneys, Cooper and Alexander Dallas, refused to appear before the Senate under these

conditions. In March, 1800, Duane himself failed to appear at his hearing, whereupon the

Senate issued an arrest warrant for his contempt.160
Smith credits Cooper’s refusal to appear before the Senate, as well as his criticism

of the whole investigation, as being the main cause of his prosecution under the Sedition
Act soon afterwards.161 Although the government likely had political motivations, as in

the Lyon case, the indictment rested upon Cooper’s criticisms of President Adams in

159 Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic,
1788-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 704-705; For a detailed discussion of the Duane
affair, sec Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 288-305; The concept of inherent legislative privileges, including the
right to punish unauthorized reports of proceedings, was well established in the practice of Parliament and
American assemblies. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 13-15.
160 Although it never arrested Duane on the warrant, the government subsequently prosecuted him
under the Sedition Act. Before his trial, however, Jefferson became President and dismissed the charges.
In his account of the Duane affair, Smith notes two interesting points of irony. In their ci fort to avoid a
legislative trial, Republican senators actually suggested that the government should instead consider
prosecuting Duane under the Sedition Act. Jefferson, as Vice-President and President of the Senate, also
signed the arrest warrant for contempt. Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 293-294, 296-298, 301, 305.
161 Ibid., 315.
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November, 1799. The trial proceeded in the federal Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania, before Justice Chase and Judge Peters.162 Cooper defended himself,
claiming that his comments were true and he lacked malicious intent. He likewise

advocated an open press as necessary to democratic government, and drew attention to
the unavoidable partisanship in sedition trials.163 The jury nevertheless found Cooper

guilty of violating the Sedition Act.164

Smith criticizes Chase by claiming that he reversed the legal burden of proof by

requiring Cooper to prove true every alleged libel in the indictment, and allowing an
inference of his malicious intent from the fact of publication. Levy also states that Chase
denied Cooper a fair trial.165 Clearly, both Chase and prosecutor William Rawle

construed the Sedition Act as nearly as possible to the common law. This approach,
however, was a legitimate means of statutory interpretation.166 Under such a view, the
Act required the government to prove affirmatively neither intent nor falsehood as

elements of the offense. As at common law, criminal intent was inferred from the fact of
publication. The falsity of the publication likewise seemed to be presumed until the
defendant could establish its truth. Chase made this point clear to the jury.

167

Chase also instructed the jury that, as the defendant “justifies the publication in all
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Wharton, State Trials, 659.
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Ibid., 664, 665.
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Ibid., 677.
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Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 324-327; Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 332.

166 Thomas F. Carroll, “Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the Federalist Period: The Sedition
Act,” Michigan Law Review 18 (1920), 648; Goebel notes how federal judges used procedural rules from
the common law in federal criminal trials. Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 655-656, 658.
167 Wharton, State Trials, 671,676; Smith, “Case Study in Suppression,” 458-459; Carroll,
“Freedom of Speech,” 641.
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its parts, and declares it to be founded in truth ..., it is your business to consider the
intent as coupled with that, and view the whole together.”168 Chase thereby disallowed

truth as a complete defense to a charge under the Sedition Act. Instead, a defendant
could establish the truth of the publication only to show that he lacked the requisite
malicious intent. The jury could then consider the truth of the publication in rendering a

verdict. Should the jury still convict, the judge could also take into account truth when
sentencing. 169

While Federalists may have sought the prosecution of Cooper for political
purposes, they were unable to distinguish his criticisms of the government and his

defiance of the Senate from disloyalty. Advocating a conservative view of
representation, Federalists believed that such contempt for the government affronted the

people themselves and subverted republican principles.170 While Chase also may have

injected his own conservative political theory into the jury charge, such judicial behavior
was common at the time.171 Upon sentencing Cooper after his conviction by the jury,

Chase agreed with him that there existed sharp political disagreements in the United
States. Political discourse, however, was no excuse for the licentiousness of the press.
“It is notorious that there are two parties in the country,” Chase addressed the defendant.
“You have stated this yourself. You have taken one side - we do not pretend to say, that

168 Wharton, State Trials, 671.

169 Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 636; In Croswell, both Hamilton and Kent expressed the
same opinion about the evidentiary role of truth in seditious libel trials. Kent seems to have interpreted the
Sedition Act in this sense, as well. People v. Croswell, reprinted in Levy, Freedom of the Press, 379, 387,
395, 399.
170 Smith, “Case Study in Suppression,” 464-465.
171 Presser, “Original Misunderstanding,” 117, 175, 181; Friedman, History of American Law, 314.
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you have not a right to express your sentiments, only taking care not to injure the

characters of those to whom you are opposed.”172 Chase and other Federalists insisted
that political opinion remain deferential to government authority. Cooper’s trial, like
Lyon’s, illustrates how the federal judiciary accepted the Sedition Act as a constitutional

means of promoting a Federalist theory of the press.173
In May and June of 1800, Chase presided over the sedition trial in Virginia of

James Callender, one of the Republican editors most despised by Federalists.174 In 1800,

Callender published the pamphlet The Prospect Before Us, supporting Jefferson as a

presidential candidate and launching a vitriolic attack on Adams and the rest of the

Federalist party.175 Chase read Callender’s pamphlet while riding Circuit duty in
Maryland, and was so inflamed by it that he procured an indictment against Callender

upon his arrival in Richmond.176 As the Virginia legislature had already condemned the
Sedition Act and there was an upcoming presidential election, the resulting trial was

highly charged politically.177

172 Wharton, State Trials, 677.

173 The Cooper trial also shows that Chase, consistent with his opinion in Worrall, was willing to
enforce traditional common-law crimes, as long as Congress had seen it necessary and proper to define
them statutorily.
174 The prosecution of Callender was the last under the Sedition Act and the only one in a southern
stale. Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 334.
175 Ibid., 339-340; Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 641; Stephen B. Presser, “Verdict on
Samuel Chase,”’ in Seriatim, 265.

176 Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 342-344; William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early
Republic: The Chief Justiceships ofJohn Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 1995), 166; Presser, “Verdict on Samuel Chase,” in Seriatim, 265.
177 Callender received several donations from prominent Virginians to support his cause, and his
attorneys defended him without charge. Callender’s counsel consisted of Philip Norborne Nicholas, the
attorney general of Virginia, William Wirt, clerk of the Virginia House of Delegates, and George Hay, a
future attorney general of Virginia. Although Callender’s attorneys were well-known in Virginia, Goebel
believes that they were not as experienced or competent as might be supposed. Goebel and Presser also
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Callender’s trial, like Cooper’s, illustrates how the Circuit Courts applied the

Sedition Act and narrowly conceived the freedom of the press. Both Chase’s rulings and
prosecutor Thomas Nelson’s arguments clarify how criminal intent differed only subtly
between the Sedition Act and the common law. As at common law, malicious intent

under the Sedition Act was inferred from the libelous nature of the publication. While
the common law presumed the defendant’s general intent merely to commit the libel
without concern as to whether the individual actually desired to cause harm, the Sedition

Act required that the defendant have specific intent to defame the government.178 This
higher standard allowed the defendant to rebut the inference of his malicious intent,
which he effectively could not do at common law once the court determined the

publications to be libelous in nature.

As in the Cooper trial, Chase adhered strictly to the rules of evidence. Although
Callender sought to prove the truth of his criticisms, Chase refused to admit any

testimony pertaining to only part of the charges. While Chase requested the prosecution
to stipulate to the admission of partial evidence, Nelson refused. Chase admitted the
possibility that his ruling was mistaken, however, and agreed to support an appeal on that

point to the Supreme Court.179 Chase also rejected defense arguments that the alleged

suggest that Republicans were mostly interested in turning the Callender trial into a political event. Smith,
Freedom’s Fetters, 346; Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 648-650; Presser, “Verdict on Samuel
Chase," in Seriatim, 266.
178 Wharton, State Trials, 695, 697-698; Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 350-351; Levy, Emergence of
a Free Press, 11; Miller, Crisis in Freedom, 85; Hamburger, “Development of the Law, 704-708.
179 Wharton, State Trials, 707-709; Thomas Carroll finds such an evidentiary standard to have
reduced substantially the ability to prove the truth of the charges. Goebel, however, defends Chase s
evidentiary rulings as correct. Chase's admission of possible error in his rulings, his request for the
government’s agreement to admit the disputed testimony, and his own support for an appeal on the question
refute the notion that Chase acted unfairly or vindictively. Carroll, “Freedom ol Speech, 639-640, Goebel,
Antecedents and Beginnings, 641,643-645.
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libels were political opinions incapable of proving as fact.180

Finally, Chase refused to allow Callender’s attorneys to argue to the jury that the
Sedition Act was unconstitutional. This ruling prompted the defense counsel to refuse
out of frustration to take any further part in the trial.181 Chase denied that the jury could
declare any state or federal law unconstitutional. He declared that “the judicial power of

the United States is the only proper and competent authority to decide whether any statute
made by Congress (or any of the state legislatures) is contrary to, or in violation of, the

Federal Constitution.”182 Chase’s opinion was consistent with that handed down by
Justice Paterson in the Lyon trial, and remains a forceful statement of the doctrine of
•

judicial review.

1

The jury convicted Callender. Upon sentencing, Chase commented upon the

dangers of seditious libels, explaining that they subverted lawful government and insulted

the people’s judgment in electing representatives. Chase also reminded Callender of the
distinction between the liberty and the licentiousness of the press. The liberty of the
press allowed fair discussion of opinion, but did not protect libels. Rather than agitate

popular opposition to government policies, citizens should either petition their legislators
or choose new ones by election.184 Chase’s statements at sentencing, as well as his
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Wharton, State Trials, 692, 695.
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Ibid., 709-712; Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 353-354.
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Wharton, State Trials, 716.
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Sec pages 55-56 above.

184 Wharton, State Trials, 718; Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 355-356; Marlin examines the Federalist
view that insulting elected representatives also affronted the people. As Chase believed, Federalists
thought that individuals should limit their political participation to petitions and elections. Martin,
“Federalist Theory of Representation,’’ 127, 158-169; Nelson also offered during the trial a good account of
the Federalist understanding of the freedom of the press. In his opening statement to the jury, he
commented that “if you believe it to be a candid and fair discussion of constitutional subjects, of real
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conduct of the trial proceedings, highlight the close relationship in both theory and
procedure between the Sedition Act and the common law in federal judicial practice.185
All the federal cases regarding the Sedition Act were at the trial level.

Accordingly, no Circuit Court issued an opinion on the constitutionality of the Act. The
trial proceedings, particularly the rulings and jury charges of the presiding Supreme

Court justices, however, reveal that federal courts applied the Sedition Act without
hesitation, construing it by the common law.186 The conduct of Paterson and Chase in the

Lyon, Cooper, and Callender trials are the most prominent examples of the federal
judiciary’s endorsement of the Sedition Act and a common-law interpretation of the First

Amendment’s press clause.
Despite the intense public controversy over the Sedition Act and Republican
grievances, or of political opinions and principles generally, you will not consider it to be a libel within the
statute. . .
Nelson later qualified himself in his closing remarks, however, by explaining the role of the
press in the electoral process and the limits of the law: “I have told you,. .. and again repeat, that it is the
peculiar privilege of every citizen of this happy country to place confidence in whom he pleases, and at the
constitutional periods of making new elections, to withdraw his confidence from a former representative,
and place his trust in another; and even expiate on the virtues of the new candidate; but this docs not
warrant him to vilify, revile, and defame another individual, who is a candidate.” Wharton, State Trials.
698, 705. Nelson’s view reflects general Federalist altitudes. Marlin, “Federalist Theory of
Representation,” 173-176.
185 Smith criticizes Chase’s conduct in the Callender trial as biased towards the prosecution.
Callender’s attorneys became so exasperated at one point that they simply refused to participate any further
in his defense. Smith, Freedom's Fetters. 347-348, 349-350, 352-354. The newly Republican controlled
Congress would subsequently impeach Chase partially upon his behavior al the Callender trial. The
impeachment was clearly a political retaliation for Chase’s vocal opposition to the Republicans, however,
and the Senate failed to convict. Although Chase’s management of the Callender trial may have been
heavy-handed, he remained within the bounds of judicial propriety for the lime. Far from being
unwarranted, his rulings in the trial were legitimate and supportable interpretations of the law. His
opinionated jury instructions were also consistent with judicial practice of the lime. Ibid., 335; Presser,
“Verdict on Samuel Chase,” in Seriatim. 266-268; Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings. 641,643-645;
Friedman, History of American Law. 314.
186 As one author explains, “the grand jury instruction was not a legal opinion per sc. Il had no
force as precedent, nor was it intended as a meditation on the merits of the law. Il was simply an
admonition.” “William Paterson and the National Jurisprudence: Two Draft Opinions on the Sedition Law
of 1798 and the Federal Common Law,” Jounial of Supreme Court History 2 (1997), 41. Because the jury
charges in the Sedition Act trials arc the clearest statements from early federal courts regarding the freedom
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assertions that it was unconstitutional, no defendant convicted under it appealed to the

Supreme Court. Opponents of the Act may have considered such an appeal to be more
dangerous than helpful to their cause. By July, 1798, several Circuit Courts had already
shown support for a federal common law of crimes.187 It became apparent with the
prosecution of Congressman Lyon that federal courts were also going to enforce the
Sedition Act. Because Supreme Court justices presided over the Circuit Courts,

Republicans could gain a sense of how they individually viewed the Sedition Act. Chief
Justice Ellsworth, and Justices William Cushing, Washington, Paterson, and Chase all
presided over federal sedition trials. Justice James Iredell participated in prosecutions

under the Act, as well as initiated the grand jury investigation leading to the 1798

common-law presentment against Cabell for seditious libel.188 It was thus clear to
Republicans that the Supreme Court would likely declare the Sedition Act constitutional
if it came before it on appeal.189 Cooper, in an 1826 essay on the Constitution, explained
why he did not appeal his conviction to the Supreme Court:

The question of the Constitutionality of the Law was not carried up to the
Supreme Court of the United Stales, because I was not then able to afford either
the time, the trouble, or the expence; and because I had not the slightest doubt, but
this question would have been decided against me there. It was thought most
prudent to leave it decided by two Circuit Judges only without argument, that the
disgrace of its solemn confirmation, might not fall on the country. At present it
can hardly be considered other than an obiter, circuit court opinion, of one Judge
of the press, however, they carry great weight in determining the early meaning of the First Amendment s
press clause.
187

See pages 47-53 above.

188

Smith, Freedom's Fetters, 183-184.

189 Miller, Crisis in Freedom, 138-139, 162; “Paterson and the National Jurisprudence,” 40;
Justice Paterson, anticipating an appeal on the Sedition Act, privately drafted two short opinions defending
its constitutionality. Paterson defined the First Amendment’s press clause by the common law. He
additionally premised federal jurisdiction over seditious libel on both a federal common law, as well as the
necessary and proper clause. Because the Supreme Court did not review the Act, Paterson never issued
cither of the opinions. Ibid., 45-48.
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of the Supreme Court, on a point not formally argued before him, and
unconfirmed by any higher decision. So that I apprehend it may be contradicted
and impugned, even under the prevailing doctrines of judicial infallibility.190
These reasons probably applied equally to the other individuals convicted under the Act.
The Sedition Act would therefore expire in 1801 without the Supreme Court having ruled
on its constitutionality.

Although it never reviewed the Sedition Act, the Supreme Court finally had the

opportunity to address the constitutionality of common-law seditious libel in United
States v. Hudson and Goodwin in 1812.191 In Hudson, the Supreme Court heard an

appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut, where the defendants had
stood trial for common-law seditious libel against the President and Congress. The

Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice John Marshall, held that federal courts did not have
inherent jurisdiction over common-law crimes. Writing for the Court, Justice William

Johnson stated that “the legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime,
affix a punishment to it, and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the
offence.”192 The Court thereby declared federal common-law prosecutions to be

unconstitutional.i 193 It refused, however, to address whether a seditious libel statute, such

as the Sedition Act, would be constitutional. Because the Supreme Court failed in

190 Thomas Cooper, Two Essays: On the Foundation of Civil Government; On the Constitution of
the United States (Columbia, S.C.: D. & J. M. Faust, 1826. Facsimile reprint, New York. Da Capo Press,
1970), 38.
191

7 Cranch 32.

192

Ibid., 34; Johnson’s opinion in Hudson reflected that of Chase in Worrall.

193

After Justice Joseph Story later supported in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
a federal common-law indictment for a crime committed upon the high seas, the Suprcmc Couri again
addressed the issue. In United States v. Coolidge,
(
„ . 1 Wheaton 415 (1816), the Court re-affirmed its decision
in Hudson. While the Court was willing to reconsider Hudson, the government declined to argue the case
and the defendant’s counsel did not even appear at the hearing. The Court refused to overturn its prior
ruling under these circumstances.
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Hudson to decide the constitutionality of the substantive doctrine of seditious libel, the

concept survived as a legitimate interpretation of the First Amendment’s press clause.
C. Seditious Libel in American Legal Scholarship
While federal courts reconciled the common law with the First Amendment

through their construction of the Sedition Act, the great law treatises of the period
continued to expose lawyers to the doctrine of seditious libel. As Levy notes, “taught law

is tough law,” and the doctrine of seditious libel continued to survive in legal scholarship
throughout the nineteenth century.194 Aspiring attorneys learned, and experienced ones

still relied upon, the law as expounded in treatises. English works, particularly
Blackstone’s Commentaries, remained the cornerstone of American legal education well

into the 1800s.195 American lawyers thereby maintained familiarity with the English
common law of seditious libel. Some American law treatises also addressed the liberty

of the press in the distinct context of constitutional law. Two of the nineteenth century’s
most influential commentaries, written by James Kent and Joseph Story, show how legal
scholarship continued to treat the common-law concept of the freedom of the press.196

194 Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 269, quoting Frederick Mailland, English Law and the
Renaissance, 18.
195 Daniel J. BoorsLin, The Mysterious Science of the Law: An Essay on Blackstone’s
Commentaries Showing how Blackstone, Employing Eighteenth-Century1 Ideas of Science, Religion,
History, Aesthetics, and Philosophy, made of the Law at once a Conservative and a Mysterious Science
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), xiii-xv, 3-4; Friedman, History of American Law, 112, 318,
323.
196 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 4 vols. (New York: O. Halstcd, 1826. Facsimile
reprint, Da Capo Press, 1971); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: with a
Preliminary Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States, Before the Adoption of the
Constitution, abridged cd. (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Company, 1833. Facsimile reprint, with an
introduction by Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Durham, N. C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1987),
Friedman refers to Kent and Story as, “by common consent, the two most significant figures in American
legal literature in the first half of the 19th century. .. .” Friedman, History of American Law, 329, In
contrast to Kent and Story, St. George Tucker denounced seditious libel as unconstitutional in his
annotations to Blackstone’s Commentaries. Tucker’s edition ol Blackstone would also be widely used
throughout the nineteenth century. While Tucker may have endorsed a broader interpretation of the I irst
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Kent, who had served on the Supreme Court of New York, wrote what is arguably

the most comprehensive and brilliant restatement of early American law. His
Commentaries on American Law, published in four volumes in the 1820s, covered all

major areas of law, and remained one of the foremost American treatises throughout the
nineteenth century. The impact of Kent’s work on most, if not all, fields of law was
undoubtedly great.197 His support of the seditious libel doctrine would therefore

introduce succeeding generations of American lawyers to the common-law definition of

the freedom of the press.
In his Commentaries, Kent readily admitted that the liberty of the press was a

constitutional principle in American law. Free and open discourse, he asserted, played an
especially significant role in the electoral process. Nevertheless, Kent expressed his firm
adherence to the doctrine of seditious libel and a common-law interpretation of the

freedom of the press.198 Restating the common law, Kent explained that individuals

making libels were subject not only to civil suits, but were also “answerable to the state
,,199

by indictment, as guilty of an offence lending directly to a breach of the public peace.”
Defamatory publications against the government and its magistrates were punishable

along with those against private individuals.

200

Kent spent little time examining the theoretical foundations of seditious libel in

Amendment’s press clause, he docs not detract from the significance of Kent and Story in preserving
seditious libel.
197 Friedman likens Kent to the “national Blackstone.” He also notes that Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. edited the 1873 edition of Kent’s Commentaries, the twelfth since its first publication. Friedman,
History of American Law, 331-332.
198

Kent, Commentaries, 2:14, 17-18.

199

Ibid., 2:13.

200

Ibid.
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American jurisprudence, but instead focused upon the evidentiary role of truth in libel
prosecutions. He made it clear that the truth of the matter published did not necessarily

excuse a libel. Instead, “the truth ought to be admissible in evidence to explain . . . intent,
and not in every instance to justify it. .. . The truth may be printed and published

maliciously, and with an evil intent, and for no good purpose... ,”201 Kent’s attention to,
and narrow view of, the evidentiary value of truth further emphasized his support of

seditious libel.202
Along with Kent, Story also perpetuated a common-law interpretation of the First
Amendment’s press clause. Story first published his Commentaries on the Constitution

of the United States in the early 1830s, while he was sitting as a justice on the United
States Supreme Court. The Commentaries provided a thorough and systematic
examination of American constitutional jurisprudence. Story originally issued his work

in several volumes, but also edited an abridged version intended for use by law
students.203 His Commentaries quickly became a popular exposition of American
constitutional law, and remained basic reading for lawyers throughout the nineteenth

century/204

Story believed that the liberty of the press was vital to republican government,
and that the First Amendment’s press clause guaranteed that liberty to American
201 Ibid., 2:22; Ibid., 2:16, 17, 19,20.

202 Kent supported a more relaxed standard of evidence when admitting truth into a public
prosecution, as opposed to a private action. He believed that the general public had less interest in private
affairs. Ibid., 2:21.
203 Friedman, History of American Law, 330; Rotunda and Nowak, introduction to Story,
Commentaries, xi, xiii.
204 Friedman, History of American Law, 329; Rotunda and Nowak state that Story’s Commentaries
“influenced at least two generations of academics, the bench, and the bar. . .. The multivolumc treatise
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citizens.

205

Notwithstanding its importance, however, the press clause did not give

blanket protection to all press activities. “That this amendment was intended to secure to

every citizen an absolute right to speak, or write, or print, whatever he might please,
without any responsibility, public or private, therefor [sic], is a supposition too wild to be

indulged by any rational man,” wrote Story.206 To permit otherwise would invite
licentious publications, which could arouse private animosities and conflict, as well as

violent opposition to the government. Civil society, as well as liberty itself, depended
upon maintaining decorum in public discourse.

Story’s views on the First Amendment were consistent with Blackstone, whom he

paraphrased when both defining the liberty of the press as the absence of prior restraint,
and contrasting that liberty with licentiousness.

707

Story thus interpreted the First

Amendment’s press clause according to the common law:

It is plain, then, that the language of this amendment imports no more, than that
every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any
subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so always that he does not injure
any other person in his rights, person, property, or reputation; and so always, that
he does not thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert the
government., 208

The remedy for such an abuse of the press was a prosecution for seditious libel. While

Story recognized the arguments advocating a more expansive freedom of the press, he
denounced them as incompatible with the principles of justice and free government.

went through five editions, the last appearing in 1905....” Rotunda and Nowak, introduction to Story,
Commentaries, xiii.
205

Story, Commentaries, 704-705.

206

Ibid., 703.

207

Ibid., 705-706.

20H

Ibid., 703-704.
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Story accepted that the truth of the matter published was admissible into evidence

at a seditious libel trial. Like Kent, however, Story believed that truth was relevant only
towards the issue of criminal intent, and did not establish a complete defense to a charge
of seditious libel. Story argued that “it has farther been held, that the truth of the facts is

not alone sufficient to justify the publication, unless it is done from good motives, and for

justifiable purposes. . . ,”209 Story’s understanding of the freedom of the press did not
excuse truthful statements, if made with malicious intentions.

Kent and Story thoroughly examined the fundamental principles of American law,

and their works would be highly influential in legal study throughout the nineteenth

century. Their commentaries, along with the classic English treatises, ensured that new
generations of lawyers would learn the doctrine of seditious libel. In the absence of a

Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of seditious libel, the opinions of legal

scholars, along with federal Circuit Court decisions, were important authorities on the

meaning of the First Amendment’s press clause. By the early twentieth century jurists
would have to assess critically the First Amendment’s press clause in the context of the

common law.
IV.

The Federalist Legacy: Seditious Libel in the Early Twentieth-Century
The Sedition Act had significant impact upon the future of American law and

government. The Act itself represented the first attempt by the federal government to
regulate the press, and was a precedent for congressional authority in that area. With the

end of the Sedition Act controversy, American courts missed the first opportunity to
reject the doctrine of seditious libel and define the First Amendment as a complete

209 Story quoted Kent’s Commentaries on American Law in support of this assertion. Ibid., 707.
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prohibition on government regulation of the press. In the early twentieth century,

however, the Supreme Court would finally consider the meaning of the First
Amendment’s press clause. Several prominent twentieth-century cases show that the
Federalists’ common-law understanding of the freedom of the press had a profound
influence on the development of First Amendment press theory.

The Supreme Court first suggested that it might accept the constitutionality of

seditious libel in the 1907 case of Patterson v. Colorado.210 In Patterson, the petitioner

appealed a state charge of contempt for publishing accusations that the Colorado
Supreme Court was prejudiced in certain cases pending before it. Justice Oliver Wendell

Holmes, Jr. delivered the Supreme Court’s opinion upholding state authority to punish
contempt. Although the Court refused to consider the petitioner’s argument that the

Fourteenth Amendment extended First Amendment press protection to the states, Holmes
nevertheless ruminated on constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press:

In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is ‘to
prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practised by
other governments,’ and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such
as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare. . . . The preliminary freedom
extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend
as well to the true as to the false. This was the law of criminal libel apart from
211
statute in most cases, if not in all.
In support of this position, Holmes cited both Respublica v. Oswald and Blackstone’s
0 1?
Commentaries. ~ His statement suggests that the First Amendment press clause

guaranteed the liberty of the press only as known at common law. Although Patterson

210 205 U.S. 454.
211

Ibid., 462.

212

Ibid.
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did not establish precedent regarding the First Amendment’s press clause, it presaged the

Court s later opinions on the issue, and shows that the common law influenced early
twentieth-century legal thought on the freedom of the press.
Seditious libel re-emerged as a major constitutional issue soon after the entry of
the United States into World War I. Concerned about internal subversion of the

government by opponents of the war effort, Congress passed the Espionage Act in

1917.213 Title one, section three of this act prohibited interference with the American war
effort by circulating false reports, disrupting military discipline, or obstructing
recruiting/Q14 Less than a year after passing the Espionage Act, Congress amended it with
the Sedition Act of 1918. Much like the Sedition Act of 1798, the act of 1918
•

•

specifically applied to press activity that defamed the federal government.

n i

In

upholding the constitutionality of these acts, the Supreme Court articulated a conservative
First Amendment theory substantially integrating the common-law doctrine of seditious
libel.

213 40 Stat. 217.

214 Title one, section three of the Espionage Act provided that “whoever, when the United States is
at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the
operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its
enemies . . . and . . . shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal
of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United Stales,... or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or
enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service of the United States, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than $10, 000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.” Chafec, Free
Speech, 38-39.

2,5 40 Stat. 553; The Sedition Act of 1918 amended the Espionage Act by outlawing the
obstruction of the sale of war bonds, and further making criminal “uttering, printing, writing, or publishing
any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language, or language intended to cause contempt, scorn,
contumely, or disrepute as regards the form of government of the United States;... the Constitution;. ..
the flag ; ... the uniform of the Army or Navy; ... or any language intended to incite resistance to the
United States or promote the cause of its enemies; . . . urging any curtailment of production of any things
necessary to the prosecution of the war with intent to hinder its prosecution;. . . advocating, leaching,
defending, or suggesting the doing of any of these acts; and . .. words or acts supporting or favoring the
cause of any country at war with . . . , or opposing the cause of the United States therein. Chafec, Free
Speech^ 40-41.
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In 1919, the Court first upheld a conviction under the Espionage Act and formally
developed a test for determining constitutionally protected speech and publications in

Schenck v. United States.2'6 The case dealt with several defendants charged under the
Espionage Act for printing and distributing leaflets urging citizens not to enlist in the
armed forces. After conviction, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court arguing

that the Espionage Act violated the First Amendment guarantee of the freedom of the
press. Holmes wrote the Court’s majority opinion, directly addressing the meaning of the

First Amendment’s press clause.
Holmes clarified that a publication need not cause actual harm to be punishable

under the Espionage Act. The offense was complete by the making of the libel, its
malicious tendency, and the defendant’s intent. 217 After recounting the contents of the
defendants’ leaflets, however, Holmes presumed criminal intent and tendency. The
defendants would not have sent the leaflets, explained Holmes, unless they had intended
them to have the effect of obstructing recruiting. Furthermore, the leaflets were of a

nature as naturally to have such an adverse effect.

218

By this analysis, the Court inferred

intent, as well as ill effect, from the mere publication of the allegedly seditious material.
Such an inference was essentially the same as that in common-law seditious libel

prosecutions.

Although seeming to infer criminal intent and bad tendency from the fact of

publication, the Court retreated somewhat from a strict common-law understanding of the

216 249 U.S. 47.
217

Ibid., 52.

218

Ibid., 51.
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First Amendment’s press clause. Holmes admitted that “it may well be that the
prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints,

although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson v.

Colorado. . . .”219 While reluctant to explore the full extent of the First Amendment’s
press guarantee, Holmes formulated the Supreme Court’s first test for determining
protected speech.220 “The question in every case,” stated Holmes, “is whether the words
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present

danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. ,,221 The Court’s test arguably narrowed the government’s latitude in prosecuting
seditious libels. Chafee notes, however, that the undefined substantive evils of which
Holmes wrote meant “successful interference with the particular power of Congress that

is in question. . . .” 222 The “clear and present danger” test therefore left unresolved the

full extent of government authority over the press, and only judged the criminality of

words in relation to the purposes of congressional regulation. Holmes’ recognition that

the criminality of words depended upon the “proximity and degree” of danger did not
refute the fundamental premise of seditious libel. 223 In Schenck, the Supreme Court
accepted that the government could prosecute individuals for making publications it

deemed harmful to it.

The Supreme Court would apply the “clear and present danger” test broadly in

219

Ibid., 51-52.

220

In Schenck, Holmes applied the same reasoning to both speech and press activity.

221

249 U.S. al 52.

222

Chafee, Free Speech, 81.

223

249 U.S. at 52.
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another 1919 case, Abrams v. United States™ In Abrams, the defendants had been

charged with violating the amended Espionage Act by publishing matter intended to

discourage munitions production, and to malign and provoke resistance to the United
States government. The defendants had distributed leaflets vehemently denouncing

President Wilson and capitalism, as well as condemning American intervention in
communist Russia. The defendants urged a general strike in protest of the government’s

policy. Justice John H. Clarke wrote the Court’s majority opinion upholding the
convictions.

The Court inferred malicious intent in Abrams, just as it had done in Schenck. In
Abrams, however, the inference was greater, as the defendants had specifically intended

to interrupt American actions in Russia, but not the war effort against the German

Empire. Clarke stated, however, that “men must be held to have intended, and to be
accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely to produce.”225 Although the

defendants may not have actually intended to cause interference with the war effort, such
was the probable result of both defaming the United States and advocating a general

strike. The Court therefore inferred intent and tendency, according to common-law

practice, from the hostile rhetoric of the leaflets/^26 The Court also refused to address the
constitutionality of the Espionage Act, finding it already decided in Schenck and other
cases. 227

224

250 U.S. 616.

225

Ibid., 621.

226

Ibid.. 620-621,622-624.

227 Ibid., 618-619; The Supreme Court also upheld the Espionage Act in such cases as Baer v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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Holmes’ dissented from the Court’s decision, arguing that only words specifically
intended to interfere with the war effort, rather than having such an indirect tendency,

were punishable. He also denied that the First Amendment retained the common law of
seditious libel, instead interpreting the “clear and present danger” requirement to mean

essentially direct incitement, rather than remote tendency, to imminent lawlessness.228
While Holmes may have argued in Abrams for broad protection of press activity, his

opinion in Schenck had already established a First Amendment standard subject to
conservative interpretation and theoretically compatible with the doctrine of seditious
libel.

The clearest expression of the Supreme Court’s acceptance of seditious libel was
in the 1925 case of Gitlow v. People of New York, in which the Court defined the freedom

of the press by the common law.

79Q

Benjamin Gitlow, who had published a call for

communist revolution, was convicted under a New York sedition statute that prohibited

advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government. In reviewing the statute, the Court
for the first time held that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the First Amendment’s
i
•
°30
press clause
to state action."

Justice Edward Sanford, in writing for the majority, explained the liberty of the
press according to the common law, citing Story as authority:

It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech
and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, docs not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an
228 See Holmes’ dissent generally, at 250 U.S. at 624-631; Holmes wrote: “I wholly disagree with
the argument of the Government that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in
force. History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that the United Slates, through many years,
had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it imposed.” Ibid., 630.

229 268 U.S. 652.
230 Ibid., 666.
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unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. . . .
Reasonably limited, it was said by Story . . . , this freedom is an inestimable
privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might become the
scourge of the republic.231

The distinction between liberty and license, as well as Blackstone’s idea that true liberty

existed through the law, had survived into early twentieth-century jurisprudence. Once
recognizing the common-law foundations of the First Amendment’s press clause, the
Supreme Court proceeded to embrace the remaining substance of the seditious libel

doctrine.
Sanford found that the advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government was
inimical to a constitutional system. He again cited Story for the proposition that such
publications abused the freedom of the press, and were punishable by the state.232 ‘This

freedom,” Sanford wrote, “does not deprive a State of the primary and essential right of
self preservation; which, so long as human governments endure, they cannot be
denied.”233 State governments, through this right, retained broad police powers in

prohibiting the advocacy of its overthrow. The Court also determined that the “clear and
present danger” test did not apply to sedition statutes, such as the one at issue, where the

legislature had made a prior determination of the “substantive evil” presented by certain
utterances. Instead, the “clear and present danger” requirement applied only when

punishing press activities pursuant to statutes outlawing acts, not words.234 Holmes’ test
in Schenck, therefore, was a standard of criminal incitement, rather than general First
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Ibid., 666-667.
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Ibid., 667.

233

Ibid., 668.

234 Ibid., 668-671.
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Amendment coverage. Instead, the Court accepted that words might be unprotected due
to a remote and indirect tendency to provoke violent resistance.235 While Sanford stated

that the Court had no need to address either the common-law rule of seditious libel, nor
the Sedition Act of 1798, the majority’s reasoning clearly defined the First Amendment’s

press clause by the common law, thus accepting the seditious libel doctrine.236
The above cases show that Supreme Court justices of the early twentieth century
were well acquainted with the common-law definition of the liberty of the press. In
Patterson, the Court suggested a common-law interpretation of the press clause, which it

would develop further by upholding the Espionage Act in Schenck and Abrams. Having
thereby accepted that the government could punish publications of a pernicious tendency,
the Court decided in Gillow that the First Amendment’s press clause was essentially

declaratory of the common law. Through these decisions, the Supreme Court formally
incorporated the doctrine of seditious libel into First Amendment jurisprudence.

Conclusion
The passage of the Sedition Act of 1798 occasioned the first serious national
debate about the meaning of the First Amendment’s press clause. Federalists, hoping to

suppress Republican press activity that they perceived to be subversive, supported the

constitutionality of the Sedition Act based upon a common-law interpretation of the

freedom of the press. Federalists claimed that the First Amendment’s press clause
prohibited Congress only from laying prior restraints upon the press, while permitting the

235 Ibid., 669.

236 Ibid., 672; Justices Holmes and Brandcis issued a brief dissenting opinion, applying the “clear
and present danger” standard, and finding that the tendency of the defendant’s publication was loo remote
to fall outside of First Amendment protection. Ibid., 672-673.
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government to prosecute individuals publishing seditious libels against it. In addition to
defining the press guarantee so narrowly, Federalists claimed that the federal judiciary

possessed an inherent jurisdiction to punish common-law crimes, such as seditious libel.

The Constitution implied such a jurisdiction, they claimed, as it was necessary to

preserve the government from the dangers of an abusive and licentious press. Just as
necessity suggested the judiciary’s common-law jurisdiction, Federalists further claimed

that Congress possessed textual authority under the Constitution’s necessary and proper
clause to proscribe statutorily seditious libels. In articulating their arguments for the
constitutionality of the Sedition Act, Federalists formulated a First Amendment theory

that bridged the gap between the unwritten common-law and the written Constitution,
and reinvigorated the seditious libel doctrine in American law.
The Supreme Court never reviewed the constitutionality of seditious libel, thereby
leaving the common law as a valid interpretation of the First Amendment’s press clause.

State courts, such as those in Pennsylvania and New York, continued to define the
freedom of the press by the common law, while lower federal courts enforced both

common-law crimes and the Sedition Act. The popular treatises of Kent and Story also

exposed nineteenth-century jurists to the traditional definition of the liberty of the press.
These legal authorities further entrenched Federalist arguments for the constitutionality of
seditious libel into First Amendment jurisprudence.
By the time the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the First Amendment’s

press clause in the early twentieth century, the common law continued to define judicial

attitudes towards the liberty of the press. Reviewing another federal sedition law, the
Espionage Act, the Court in Schenck v. United Stales and Abrams v. United States
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recognized Congress’ authority to regulate press activity. In Gitlow v. People of New

York, the Court defined the First Amendment’s press clause by the common law, and
clearly endorsed the doctrine of seditious libel.

The Supreme Court’s decisions in the Espionage Act cases, and especially in

Gitlow, were theoretical outgrowths of the Sedition Act controversy. The reasoning
followed by the Court in those cases rested squarely upon arguments long before

constructed by Federalists in defending the constitutionality of the Sedition Act, and then
preserved in court cases and legal literature. Although the Court would substantially

broaden the freedom of the press in the latter half of the twentieth-century, its point of

departure would be a conservative First Amendment jurisprudence incorporating

seditious libel and defined by the common law.
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